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On 17/12/08 December I published this piece about the North Korean Arms detained in Thailand. I received the following comment, so in fairness I will publish the response in its entirety. It is unedited, an unverified, but if it comes from GT Group Limnitted, it suggests someone in the UK is behind SP Trading
Shimron Issachar
Ian Taylor said...
18 December 2009
SP Trading Limited – in reference to seized weapons in Thailand
GT Group Limited, Port Vila Vanuatu – We are a consulting company based in Vanuatu, providing various business and company incorporation services to professional clients internationally. We provide this service from Vanuatu, New Zealand, Cook Island, Samoa and other jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction has various requirements for due diligence and or identification of the beneficial owner or operator of the incorporated company.
GT Group Limited follows the due diligence and client identification requirements according to the laws of each jurisdiction from which it offers services. GT Group Limited is not responsible for the operation or activities of companies that it has incorporated. GT Group Limited may at times also supply a Nominee Director or Shareholder and in the case of SP Trading Limited, we can confirm that GT Group Limited has supplied such.
SP Trading Limited was incorporated by our New Zealand Agent the 22nd day of July, 2009 at the request of one of our professional clients based in the United Kingdom. The professional client met the due diligence requirements in place with regard to identification of the beneficial owner.
GT Group Limited confirms that it has no connection to the activities of SP Trading Limited and strongly emphasizes that it acted as an Incorporator and Registered Agent only.
All persons employed by, contracted by, or sub contracted by GT Group Limited in relation to the incorporation and Nominee Directorship and Nominee Shareholding of SP Trading Limited have no knowledge of the activities of SP Trading Limited and are in no way involved with the shipment of any items of any kind, at any location and by any means.
GT Group Limited has approached the New Zealand Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in a pro-active move to fully cooperate with any investigation in any jurisdiction in relation to SP Trading Limited or its beneficial owners. As of the issue of this press release, GT Group Limited has in no way been contacted by any authority.
Time: 1:00PM, Vanuatu Time.
Date: December 18, 2009
Location: Port Vila, Vanuatu.
Contact person: Ian Taylor by telephone (+61) 450955048.
Further Comments: No further comments will be made by any person other than the above appointed person and any attempt to obtain comments from any other employee, manager, director, agent or associates will be met with a “no comment” response.
END GT GROUP LIMITED MANAGEMENT STATEMENT
2:28 AM
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
NAIROBI, Kenya, December 9 (CDN) — Somali Christian Mohamud Muridi Saidi last month fled a refugee camp near Kenya’s border with Sudan after Muslims threatened to kill him.
For Saidi, a father of four, the recent relocation of 13,000 refugees from the Dadaab refugee camp near the Somali border to the Kakuma camp, where he had lived since 2002, brought its own nightmare: the arrival of Muslims from Somalia’s Lower Juba region who knew of his father’s Christian activities in his home village.
After Somalis four times threw stones at Saidi’s iron sheet home in the Kakuma refugee camp – once in mid-October, and again on Nov. 17, 21 and 22 – word spread that they intended to kill him. Case workers for a Lutheran World Federation (LWF) service group confirmed the death threat.
“I know the attackers are the Muslims who forced us to leave Somalia in 2002,” Saidi told Compass in Nairobi, adding that he was unable to bring his family with him when he fled on Nov. 23. “
They are not safe, and that is why we should be out of Kakuma as soon as possible.”
Saidi has reported the attacks to the LWF service group as well as to police in Kakuma. Case workers for the LWF service group confirmed that the stoning of his home had escalated to the threat of him being assassinated.
“Saidi has security-related issues fueled by the new refugees from Dadaab,” said one LWF service group worker, who requested anonymity for security reasons, last month. “I did some investigation and found out that Saidi’s life is threatened.”
On one of the occasions in which his house was stoned as his family slept, Saidi turned on a flashlight and neighbors rose up, scaring off the assailants.
He and his family had enjoyed some tranquility since fleeing raging conflict in Somalia, but that ceased with the transference of the Somali Muslims from Dadaab refugee camp to Kakuma in August. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees relocated the refugees to ease congestion in the crowded Dadaab camps of Ifo, Hagadera and Dagahaley, where close to 300,000 Somalis had arrived to sites designed to house only 90,000 refugees.
The influx of those refugees from the Dadaab camp more than 1,000 kilometers (621 miles) away came with the quickly spreading word that Saidi and his family must be Christian, since his father was a well-known Christian while living in Somalia. A Somali Bantu from Marere, Lower Juba, Saidi’s family left Marere in 2002 after strict Muslims sought to kill them when they found out they were followers of Christ.
Saidi’s late father had coordinated activities for a Christian charity in Lower Juba. Since the death of his father in 2005, Saidi has been working as a translator for a Non-Governmental Organization. As a translator, he became known to the newly arrived Somalis from Dadaab.
Because of the dangers, Saidi has been forced to abandon his job for fear of exposing himself to other Muslims who might know of his father. He is the sole supporter for his family, including his 55-year-old mother, wife and four children.
“It is not safe for us to continue living in Kakuma – we have to move away, possibly to Nairobi,” Saidi said.
As a stop-gap measure, Saidi said he hopes to work as a freelance translator, for which he would need a computer, printer, photocopying machine and laminator.
“This would be a temporary measure – asylum for my family would be a permanent solution,” he said.
Despite the relocation of the refugees from Dadaab, overcrowding has not eased due an influx of newly displaced people fleeing fighting in southern Somalia. Earlier this month, radical Islamic al Shabaab militia recaptured three key towns, including the key town of Dobhley, in Lower Juba province along Somalia’s border with Kenya. They retook control from the more moderate Isbul-Islam militants as they each try to overthrow the Western-backed Transitional Federal Government of president Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed in Mogadishu.
Report from Compass Direct News
Particular Kev
Shimronletters
For Saidi, a father of four, the recent relocation of 13,000 refugees from the Dadaab refugee camp near the Somali border to the Kakuma camp, where he had lived since 2002, brought its own nightmare: the arrival of Muslims from Somalia’s Lower Juba region who knew of his father’s Christian activities in his home village.
After Somalis four times threw stones at Saidi’s iron sheet home in the Kakuma refugee camp – once in mid-October, and again on Nov. 17, 21 and 22 – word spread that they intended to kill him. Case workers for a Lutheran World Federation (LWF) service group confirmed the death threat.
“I know the attackers are the Muslims who forced us to leave Somalia in 2002,” Saidi told Compass in Nairobi, adding that he was unable to bring his family with him when he fled on Nov. 23. “
They are not safe, and that is why we should be out of Kakuma as soon as possible.”
Saidi has reported the attacks to the LWF service group as well as to police in Kakuma. Case workers for the LWF service group confirmed that the stoning of his home had escalated to the threat of him being assassinated.
“Saidi has security-related issues fueled by the new refugees from Dadaab,” said one LWF service group worker, who requested anonymity for security reasons, last month. “I did some investigation and found out that Saidi’s life is threatened.”
On one of the occasions in which his house was stoned as his family slept, Saidi turned on a flashlight and neighbors rose up, scaring off the assailants.
He and his family had enjoyed some tranquility since fleeing raging conflict in Somalia, but that ceased with the transference of the Somali Muslims from Dadaab refugee camp to Kakuma in August. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees relocated the refugees to ease congestion in the crowded Dadaab camps of Ifo, Hagadera and Dagahaley, where close to 300,000 Somalis had arrived to sites designed to house only 90,000 refugees.
The influx of those refugees from the Dadaab camp more than 1,000 kilometers (621 miles) away came with the quickly spreading word that Saidi and his family must be Christian, since his father was a well-known Christian while living in Somalia. A Somali Bantu from Marere, Lower Juba, Saidi’s family left Marere in 2002 after strict Muslims sought to kill them when they found out they were followers of Christ.
Saidi’s late father had coordinated activities for a Christian charity in Lower Juba. Since the death of his father in 2005, Saidi has been working as a translator for a Non-Governmental Organization. As a translator, he became known to the newly arrived Somalis from Dadaab.
Because of the dangers, Saidi has been forced to abandon his job for fear of exposing himself to other Muslims who might know of his father. He is the sole supporter for his family, including his 55-year-old mother, wife and four children.
“It is not safe for us to continue living in Kakuma – we have to move away, possibly to Nairobi,” Saidi said.
As a stop-gap measure, Saidi said he hopes to work as a freelance translator, for which he would need a computer, printer, photocopying machine and laminator.
“This would be a temporary measure – asylum for my family would be a permanent solution,” he said.
Despite the relocation of the refugees from Dadaab, overcrowding has not eased due an influx of newly displaced people fleeing fighting in southern Somalia. Earlier this month, radical Islamic al Shabaab militia recaptured three key towns, including the key town of Dobhley, in Lower Juba province along Somalia’s border with Kenya. They retook control from the more moderate Isbul-Islam militants as they each try to overthrow the Western-backed Transitional Federal Government of president Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed in Mogadishu.
Report from Compass Direct News
Particular Kev
Shimronletters
Thursday, December 17, 2009
Vanuatu-based GT Group Behind North Korean Arms Shipment
Vanatu, an Island 2200 KM East of Australia, near Fiji is the base for GT Group, the owners of Viacom, a company formed in Aukland, New Zealand about 6 months ago. Viacom chartered the Viktor Bout Ilyushin-76 aircraft that was transporting 35 tonnes or arms, 140 crates, to parts unknown, possilby Iran. During a stopover,The plane was detained in Thiland, and TBDA suggests the deal may have been set up and coordinated by Russian Speakers out of Uzbekistan.
-Shimron Issachar
WELLINGTON (AFP) – The New Zealand government said Thursday it was investigating whether there were any links between a New Zealand-registered company and a huge cache of weapons flown out of North Korea.
The 35-tonne load, including missiles and rocket-propelled grenades, was discovered after the plane and its Belarussian pilot and four Kazakh crew landed to refuel at Bangkok's domestic airport on Friday.
A New Zealand foreign ministry spokeswoman said it was investigating reported New Zealand links to the shipment.
"We are aware of the media reports and are seeking to verify any substance to allegations of a New Zealand connection," the spokeswoman said.
Officials in Kazakhstan -- where an airline previously owned the seized Ilyushin Il-76 aircraft -- said the plane had been leased by the Georgian owners to a company called SP Trading in New Zealand.
"According to the information of the Kazakh diplomatic mission in Thailand and competent organs in Kazakhstan, the detained Ilyushin-76 aircraft was... rented to a New Zealand company, SP Trading Limited, to carry out the delivery of cargo," Kazakh foreign ministry spokesman Ilyas Omarov said Monday.
A company called SP Trading is on the New Zealand Companies Register with an office in Auckland. The only listed director is Lu Zhang and all the company shares are owned by another company Vicam (Auckland) Ltd.
Vicam in turn is owned by Vanuatu-based GT Group, whose website says it provides services including privacy, legal tax avoidance, and asset protection.
Attempts by journalists to visit or contact SP Trading, which was incorporated in July this year, and Zhang have been unsuccessful, New Zealand media reports said.
The Soviet-era aircraft was seized in the Thai capital on Friday during a refuelling stop and was discovered to be carrying about 35 tonnes of weapons from North Korea, in violation of UN sanctions against Pyongyang.
The plane's five crew members have been charged in Thailand with possessing war weapons but police said they deny knowing what they were transporting.
On Monday, a Thai court extended the detention of the crew so police could investigate further.
It is the first known airborne arms cargo seized under the latest UN resolution against North Korea -- adopted in response to Pyongyang's nuclear programme -- and Washington has hailed it as proof sanctions have been effective.
Thai media have claimed the authorities were tipped off about the plane by US intelligence.
The Rest @ AFP
-Shimron Issachar
WELLINGTON (AFP) – The New Zealand government said Thursday it was investigating whether there were any links between a New Zealand-registered company and a huge cache of weapons flown out of North Korea.
The 35-tonne load, including missiles and rocket-propelled grenades, was discovered after the plane and its Belarussian pilot and four Kazakh crew landed to refuel at Bangkok's domestic airport on Friday.
A New Zealand foreign ministry spokeswoman said it was investigating reported New Zealand links to the shipment.
"We are aware of the media reports and are seeking to verify any substance to allegations of a New Zealand connection," the spokeswoman said.
Officials in Kazakhstan -- where an airline previously owned the seized Ilyushin Il-76 aircraft -- said the plane had been leased by the Georgian owners to a company called SP Trading in New Zealand.
"According to the information of the Kazakh diplomatic mission in Thailand and competent organs in Kazakhstan, the detained Ilyushin-76 aircraft was... rented to a New Zealand company, SP Trading Limited, to carry out the delivery of cargo," Kazakh foreign ministry spokesman Ilyas Omarov said Monday.
A company called SP Trading is on the New Zealand Companies Register with an office in Auckland. The only listed director is Lu Zhang and all the company shares are owned by another company Vicam (Auckland) Ltd.
Vicam in turn is owned by Vanuatu-based GT Group, whose website says it provides services including privacy, legal tax avoidance, and asset protection.
Attempts by journalists to visit or contact SP Trading, which was incorporated in July this year, and Zhang have been unsuccessful, New Zealand media reports said.
The Soviet-era aircraft was seized in the Thai capital on Friday during a refuelling stop and was discovered to be carrying about 35 tonnes of weapons from North Korea, in violation of UN sanctions against Pyongyang.
The plane's five crew members have been charged in Thailand with possessing war weapons but police said they deny knowing what they were transporting.
On Monday, a Thai court extended the detention of the crew so police could investigate further.
It is the first known airborne arms cargo seized under the latest UN resolution against North Korea -- adopted in response to Pyongyang's nuclear programme -- and Washington has hailed it as proof sanctions have been effective.
Thai media have claimed the authorities were tipped off about the plane by US intelligence.
The Rest @ AFP
Viktor Bout' Arms Transport Caught in Tailand With North Korean Arms
12/17/09 10:53 AM EST BANGKOK — Thai authorities were acting on a tip from the United States when they seized tons of illicit weapons from a plane from North Korea, a senior official said Thursday.
The Ilyushin Il-76 transport plane was impounded Saturday in Bangkok during what officials said was a scheduled refueling stop. Thai authorities found a reported 35 tons of weaponry aboard it, all exported from North Korea in defiance of U.N. sanctions.
Speaking at a news conference, National Security Council chief Thawil Pliensri confirmed media reports that there had been U.S. assistance in the seizure, but gave no details.
He said that Thailand was waiting for advice from the United Nations on whether the weapons should be destroyed.
The U.N. sanctions — which ban North Korea from exporting any arms — were imposed in June after the reclusive communist regime conducted a nuclear test and test-fired missiles. They are aimed at derailing North Korea's nuclear weapons program, but also ban it from selling any conventional arms.
Thawil revealed little else new at his news conference, which seemed aimed at quashing some rumors. He denied that Thailand would receive a reward or bounty for the seizure, or that it was pressured to act, saying it took action "as a member of the world community."
He added, however, that Thailand would like to be compensated if possible by the U.N. for the cost of transporting the weapons, which were taken to an Air Force base in the nearby province of Nakhon Sawan.
It is still not known where the weapons — said to include
Shimron Letters on Twitter
The Ilyushin Il-76 transport plane was impounded Saturday in Bangkok during what officials said was a scheduled refueling stop. Thai authorities found a reported 35 tons of weaponry aboard it, all exported from North Korea in defiance of U.N. sanctions.
Speaking at a news conference, National Security Council chief Thawil Pliensri confirmed media reports that there had been U.S. assistance in the seizure, but gave no details.
He said that Thailand was waiting for advice from the United Nations on whether the weapons should be destroyed.
The U.N. sanctions — which ban North Korea from exporting any arms — were imposed in June after the reclusive communist regime conducted a nuclear test and test-fired missiles. They are aimed at derailing North Korea's nuclear weapons program, but also ban it from selling any conventional arms.
Thawil revealed little else new at his news conference, which seemed aimed at quashing some rumors. He denied that Thailand would receive a reward or bounty for the seizure, or that it was pressured to act, saying it took action "as a member of the world community."
He added, however, that Thailand would like to be compensated if possible by the U.N. for the cost of transporting the weapons, which were taken to an Air Force base in the nearby province of Nakhon Sawan.
It is still not known where the weapons — said to include
- explosives,
- rocket-propelled grenades
- components for surface-to-air missiles
- and other armaments — were to be delivered.
The plane's papers, which described its cargo as oil-drilling machinery, said the shipment was to be delivered to Sri Lanka.
Arms trade experts have speculated that the cargo may have been destined for conflict zones in Africa, Iran or Myanmar.
U.S. Treasury Department records show that the plane had previously been registered with firms controlled by suspected arms trafficker Russian Viktor Bout, who is currently being held in Thailand.
The U.S. is trying to extradite him on terrorism charges. On Wednesday, he denied any involvement with the plane, according to Russian news agency ITAR-Tass, accusing the media of trying to influence the decision in his extradition hearing.
The crew — four from Kazakhstan and one from Belarus — have been jailed on illegal arms possession charges.
The wife of Mikail Petukhov — the Belarussian identified in Thai court documents — said he had served in the Soviet military and afterward took whatever job he could find. Vera Petukhova said her husband never knows who he'll be working with before going out on a job. A friend of Petukhov, 54, added that he also never knows what he'll be transporting.
"All the containers are sealed, and the captain only gets the printout of what is supposed to be inside them. But what's inside, that's a question for the people who load it onto the plane at the pick-up point," said Vladimir Migol, who also served in the Soviet air force and noted that many ex-service men struggled to find work after being discharged. Migol said while crew members such as Petukhov would never knowingly transport weapons, they are all aware of the risk but are usually desperate for jobs.
The plane was registered to Air West, a cargo transport company in the former Soviet republic of Georgia.
Kazakhstan's Foreign Ministry said this week that the plane was leased to New Zealand company SP Trading Ltd.
Authorities in New Zealand are investigating, a spokesman for its Foreign Ministry, James Funnell said Thursday.
"We have always been staunch supporters of the sanctions regime imposed against North Korea," Funnell told The Associated Press. "So we're very concerned by these allegations and are inquiring into them."
SP Trading is listed in the government's register of companies as having offices in Auckland, New Zealand's largest city, which names Lu Zhang as its director. The company's shares are held by nominee company VICAM (Auckland) Ltd. Listed phone numbers rang unanswered on Thursday.
Impoverished North Korea is believed to earn hundreds of millions of dollars every year by selling missiles, missile parts and other weapons to countries such as Iran, Syria and Myanmar.
Associated Press writer Simon Shuster contributed to this report from Kiev, Ukraine.
(This version CORRECTS that ITAR-Tass report was from Wednesday, not Thursday.)
The Rest @ the AP
Shimron Letters on Twitter
Friday, December 11, 2009
Saleh al-Somali Dead
WASHINGTON – A senior al-Qaida operations planner was killed in an American missile strike this week in western Pakistan, a U.S. counterterrorism official said Friday.
Saleh al-Somali was responsible for the terror group's operations outside the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, reaching into activities in Africa. The official said al-Somali was believed to have been involved in plotting attacks against the United States and Europe. He was killed by an unmanned drone missile Tuesday.
The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss covert operations, said al-Somali was part of al-Qaida's senior leadership circle and had connections to other Pakistan-based extremists. His role was to take guidance from senior leaders and develop plans for prospective terrorist attacks, the official said.
Previously, al-Somali had worked in tribal areas of Pakistan with newly arrived Westerners recruited by al-Qaida.
Intelligence officials have confirmed that the pace of attacks by armed unmanned aerial vehicles, conducted largely by the CIA, has increased during the Obama administration.
The strikes have fanned anti-American sentiment in Pakistan because they have caused many civilian deaths. Since Jan. 28, 2008, there have been at least 67 suspected U.S. missile strikes into Pakistan.
The Rest @ The AP
Saleh al-Somali was responsible for the terror group's operations outside the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, reaching into activities in Africa. The official said al-Somali was believed to have been involved in plotting attacks against the United States and Europe. He was killed by an unmanned drone missile Tuesday.
The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss covert operations, said al-Somali was part of al-Qaida's senior leadership circle and had connections to other Pakistan-based extremists. His role was to take guidance from senior leaders and develop plans for prospective terrorist attacks, the official said.
Previously, al-Somali had worked in tribal areas of Pakistan with newly arrived Westerners recruited by al-Qaida.
Intelligence officials have confirmed that the pace of attacks by armed unmanned aerial vehicles, conducted largely by the CIA, has increased during the Obama administration.
The strikes have fanned anti-American sentiment in Pakistan because they have caused many civilian deaths. Since Jan. 28, 2008, there have been at least 67 suspected U.S. missile strikes into Pakistan.
The Rest @ The AP
Friday, December 04, 2009
Pakistan Reserved on Obama's Troop Plan
4 December 2009 LONDON — Pakistan’s prime minister on Thursday defended his country’s efforts in fighting terrorism, saying he didn’t believe Osama bin Laden was in Pakistan and that Pakistani security forces had been successful in tackling terrorism within the country’s borders.
Yousuf Raza Gilani, who was meeting with his British counterpart Gordon Brown in London, was responding to Brown’s demands earlier that Pakistan needed to do more to find bin Laden.
“I doubt the information which you are giving is correct because I don’t think Osama bin Laden is in Pakistan,” Gilani said at a joint news conference.
“Pakistan is fighting the war on terrorism, and we have a good intelligence and defense cooperation with the United States,” he said, adding that the U.S. and Britain have not provided any actionable intelligence about bin Laden’s purported whereabouts.
Gilani also signaled his country’s cautious response to President Barack Obama’s new policy for Pakistan and Afghanistan by declining to endorse the U.S.-led troop surge. He said his government needs more information about Obama’s plan to expand the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and at the same time increase aid to Pakistan.
Gilani said Pakistan was looking into the policy announced by Obama on Tuesday, including the suggestion that more covert CIA resources would be deployed in Pakistan, where the central government faces a strong threat from Islamic extremists.
“Regarding the new policy of President Obama, we are studying that policy,” Gilani said. “We need more clarity on it, and when we get more clarity on it, we can see what we can implement on that plan.”
Unlike Brown, who strongly supports Obama’s approach and is sending 500 more British troops to Afghanistan to augment the surge, Pakistani leaders had remained silent until Gilani’s carefully worded comments.
Analysts said the lack of a public endorsement of U.S. policy is in part a response to rising anti-American sentiment in Pakistan that prevents national leaders from publicly embracing expanded U.S. aid — even if they need the support.
Since 2001, the U.S. has given the Pakistani army billions of dollars to try to get it to fight Islamic militants along the Afghan border. Starting last year, the U.S. began a sustained program of covert missile strikes against militant targets close to the border.
The results have been mixed. While the army has taken on the Pakistani Taliban, it has failed to go after Afghan Taliban leaders who base their operations in the tribal areas in the border region. At the same time, anti-Western sentiment, spurred by the security forces, has grown.
Many Western officials and analysts believe Pakistan is playing off both sides — accepting U.S. funds to crack down on Pakistani militants while tolerating the Afghan Taliban in the expectation that the radical Islamic movement will take power in Afghanistan once the Americans withdraw.
Shaun Gregory, an expert on Pakistani security at the University of Bradford in Britain, said the Pakistanis will take note of Obama’s pledge to start bringing U.S. troops home from Afghanistan in July 2011.
“The Pakistanis are smart enough to read the signals coming out of Washington,” Gregory said. “It seems to me that the army’s longer-term strategy of broadly backing the Afghan Taliban is paying off now. They have their tails up.”
Gilani said his government expects to learn more about U.S. plans when Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visit Pakistan.
Gilani has been lukewarm to the idea of a troop surge, saying he fears it would merely push Afghan militants across the mountainous border region into Pakistan.
The U.S. and Britain have been putting pressure on Pakistan to root out the militants already on its side of the border, in a lawless area from which they frequently attack NATO and Afghan troops.
Senior U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, have castigated Pakistan for its failure to find al-Qaida chief Osama bin Laden, believed by many to be hiding in tribal regions of Pakistan.
Gilani stressed Thursday that Pakistan has been “extremely successful” in tackling terrorism and that most Taliban terrorists are not in Pakistan but in neighboring Afghanistan.
The Rest @ Khaleej Times
Yousuf Raza Gilani, who was meeting with his British counterpart Gordon Brown in London, was responding to Brown’s demands earlier that Pakistan needed to do more to find bin Laden.
“I doubt the information which you are giving is correct because I don’t think Osama bin Laden is in Pakistan,” Gilani said at a joint news conference.
“Pakistan is fighting the war on terrorism, and we have a good intelligence and defense cooperation with the United States,” he said, adding that the U.S. and Britain have not provided any actionable intelligence about bin Laden’s purported whereabouts.
Gilani also signaled his country’s cautious response to President Barack Obama’s new policy for Pakistan and Afghanistan by declining to endorse the U.S.-led troop surge. He said his government needs more information about Obama’s plan to expand the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and at the same time increase aid to Pakistan.
Gilani said Pakistan was looking into the policy announced by Obama on Tuesday, including the suggestion that more covert CIA resources would be deployed in Pakistan, where the central government faces a strong threat from Islamic extremists.
“Regarding the new policy of President Obama, we are studying that policy,” Gilani said. “We need more clarity on it, and when we get more clarity on it, we can see what we can implement on that plan.”
Unlike Brown, who strongly supports Obama’s approach and is sending 500 more British troops to Afghanistan to augment the surge, Pakistani leaders had remained silent until Gilani’s carefully worded comments.
Analysts said the lack of a public endorsement of U.S. policy is in part a response to rising anti-American sentiment in Pakistan that prevents national leaders from publicly embracing expanded U.S. aid — even if they need the support.
Since 2001, the U.S. has given the Pakistani army billions of dollars to try to get it to fight Islamic militants along the Afghan border. Starting last year, the U.S. began a sustained program of covert missile strikes against militant targets close to the border.
The results have been mixed. While the army has taken on the Pakistani Taliban, it has failed to go after Afghan Taliban leaders who base their operations in the tribal areas in the border region. At the same time, anti-Western sentiment, spurred by the security forces, has grown.
Many Western officials and analysts believe Pakistan is playing off both sides — accepting U.S. funds to crack down on Pakistani militants while tolerating the Afghan Taliban in the expectation that the radical Islamic movement will take power in Afghanistan once the Americans withdraw.
Shaun Gregory, an expert on Pakistani security at the University of Bradford in Britain, said the Pakistanis will take note of Obama’s pledge to start bringing U.S. troops home from Afghanistan in July 2011.
“The Pakistanis are smart enough to read the signals coming out of Washington,” Gregory said. “It seems to me that the army’s longer-term strategy of broadly backing the Afghan Taliban is paying off now. They have their tails up.”
Gilani said his government expects to learn more about U.S. plans when Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visit Pakistan.
Gilani has been lukewarm to the idea of a troop surge, saying he fears it would merely push Afghan militants across the mountainous border region into Pakistan.
The U.S. and Britain have been putting pressure on Pakistan to root out the militants already on its side of the border, in a lawless area from which they frequently attack NATO and Afghan troops.
Senior U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, have castigated Pakistan for its failure to find al-Qaida chief Osama bin Laden, believed by many to be hiding in tribal regions of Pakistan.
Gilani stressed Thursday that Pakistan has been “extremely successful” in tackling terrorism and that most Taliban terrorists are not in Pakistan but in neighboring Afghanistan.
The Rest @ Khaleej Times
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
The Muslim Brotherhood's African Failures
Recent strengthening of Sufi Militia Groups in Somalia suggest that African Sufi s may be reaching a breaking point. Salafi Khalifa-supporting Muslims desecrate Sufi religious sites with more and more frequency in territories Islamists control.
A counter islamist move would be to support these Sufi groups as they challenge the Sharia imposed on them.
What NOT to do:
The analysis that follows is a recent deconstruction of the past failures of the Muslim Brother Hood in their efforts to convert Sudanese Sufi Muslims with Safafi Dawa. It serves to illustrate my points.
-Shimron Issachar
By Mahgoub El-Tigani
November 13, 2009 – The issues concerning our Nation these days are multi-faceted: (effective ending of the escalated crisis in Darfur to the advantage of the victimized population of the region; democratic transition by fair elections and consensual security measures; faithful procession of the optional unity referendum; due prosecution and eradication of the government’s self-incited corruption; and continuous principled application of the unfulfilled agenda of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) by restructured workable relations with the Sudanese opposition forces and the International Community, especially the United States and the International Criminal Court, among many other national and international concerns).
Politicians have already burdened their agenda with the issue of national elections as a key factor to complete the transition to democratic rule. Political sociologists, including this writer, however, are more concerned with the structural situation of the country, namely the possibilities of harmonizing the North-South state relations to end increasing tensions in the level of state authority and the constitutional jurisdictions of state-managers. But the roles to be played by opposition groups and the International Community are indeed prominent: The latter entities, opposition and internationals, would have to work closely with both Federal (Central) Government and the South Sudan Government to bring about a flexible formula to accomplish the outstanding agenda for the ongoing democratic transition.
A fact often left out in the political formulae of the country’s state of affairs, nevertheless, is that both opposition groups and the International Community would have to consider seriously the urgent need to appreciate indigenous components of the formula in terms of two realities: 1) The Old Society of Sudan led by the Sufi large traditional forces in the North, and 2) the New Sudan’s aspiring groups [of which the anti-democratic extremist NIF/NCP MB ruling party is de facto authority body] the Self-Autonomy Armed Groups (SAAG) chiefly the SPLM, as well as Darfur and the East self-autonomy armed groups manifested a different path of political development in the light of the CPA.
Uniquely different from both groups, the 1930s-2000s Democratic Modern Forces (DMF), namely the secular trades unions, liberal political parties, and voluntary human rights and democracy groups, constituted an independent political category that has consistently forced an independent path of development in the state and society relations. At this point, it is worthy to mention the genius efforts Joseph Garang, the first minister of the newly-established South Affairs Ministry, exerted in the late 1960s to boost DMF relationships in the two parts of the Nation.
The SAAG has shown in the post-CPA years (2005-9) mounting influence in the public life as they evolved in the regions with significant connections in the national and the international space. Except for the NIF/NCP MB hegemony over the State and the national economy, which has been further characterized by financial corruption, abuses of authority (up to the most recent partisan intrusions in the elections’ registration process), and an unprecedented record of human rights violations, the SAAG leading the South, East, and Darfur regions has not yet offered clear democratic styles of governance; instead, they often acted in reaction to the NIF/NCP offensive practices.
Of particular significance, the national and the international media and diplomacy have largely defaulted in appreciating the key issue of highlighting the Old Sudan statuses and roles before and after the CPA and in the future affairs of the country. Because our post-independence national elections revealed the persistent influence of the Umma and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) traditional parties as leading constituencies in the democratic national elections, we will discus briefly the situation of the Old Sudan popular constituencies, which based on Sufi Islam remain the sole real competitor of the NIF/NCP state-supported party in the northern, eastern, western, and central regions of North Sudan.
THE SUDANESE INDIGENOUS MUSLIMS
The international media and diplomacy must first of all recognize that the significance of Islam for the social life of the majority Muslim populations is omnipotent. Over long centuries of cultural and religious adaptations with the deeply rooted African origins of the Nation, the Sudanese society has creatively incorporated principal teachings of Islam, whatever adoptable, in accordance with African cultures and social structures. The only doctrines that most competently contained such adoptions were those of the Sufi traditions of the Sunni Islam that exerted a great effort by their founding jurists to be part of the Sudanese-African belief systems, the prevalent administrative and political self-autonomous arrangements (as in the Darfur agricultural hakorat), and the matrilineal family relations that carried with them tremendous respect to the women as well as the extended family/tribal solidarity communalities in the context of an overwhelming Bedouin and agrarian norms of the social life.
Since the advent of Islam and its peaceful penetration in the indigenous life of the 5-centuries old Nubia Christendom’s, the politics of the country have been firmly founded on this socio-religious amalgam, which is most articulated in the Sufi traditions of the North. This writer disagrees with the opinion that the Sudanese Islam was solely brought into the country by famous Egyptian, Iraqi, and Moroccan jurists. The impact of the Nubian Christians, the inhabitants of the land that basically adopted Islam, and their once-committed clergy of the Church, as well as the influences of Sudanese African cultures, were major sources of the rituals, spiritualities, and beliefs of the post-Christian Sufi traditions together with the worshipping and transactional jurisprudence of classical Islam. The most important inherited authority that documented this fact indirectly by its own unique style was the Tabaqat of Sheikh Mohamed Daif-Allah which reflected a massive mythology of the Sudanese medieval African, Christian, and Islamic heritages. This research area is unnecessarily neglected, although it reveals significant aspects of Sudanese personality and Sufi Islam.
The Sudanese Sufi Islam’s glorious tendencies of peaceful co-existence, equalitarianism, tolerance of social differences, and emphasis on humanitarian relations was nothing but a huge product of the African-Christian-Islamic merges of the country’s cultures and beliefs. In the colonial and the post-independence times, even the secular DMF collaborated openly with prevailing Sufi traditions of the Nation that pervaded both the Muslim and the non-Muslim communities of the North, in particular, in religious, social, and political terms. Still in the South, small groups in the provincial towns exercised the Khatmiya, Ansar, and other Sufi traditions, thus maintaining political commitments to the Umma and the DUP political parties rather than acquiring memberships of the southerner political groups. Besides the warring environment by a prolonged civil war, the lacking of large urban and industrial settings, moreover, precluded the spread of DMF in the villages and towns of the South.
THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) did not share the same concerns of the Sufi traditions of Sudan. Influenced by the foreign thought of Egyptian, Iranian, and other fundamentalist doctrines, the Brotherhood was destined to align with governments and authorities rather than the Sufi groups throughout the MB experiences with the state and society. Early in the October Revolution 1964, the MB leadership supported the generals of the defunct November 1957-64 dictatorship to enable them to escape legal prosecution. Repeatedly in the 1970s and 1980s of the Nimeiri era, the MB cooperated with the falling regime to inherit almost all its ruling apparatuses only to persecute people.
Later in the April Uprising 1985, the MB collaborated with the Transitional Military Council to ensure political dominance over the upcoming national elections and the ensuing Constituent Assembly. But the biggest victory of the MB striving to monopolize power and wealth was achieved evidently by the June coup 1983 by which the MB monopolized state powers to favor an Islamic Project supported vehemently by international allies in Iran and other Middle East societies. The face of the Sudanese politics indicates prolonged control by the MB over state politics, even after the CPA. Still, the societal conditions, intellectual resistance, and above all Sufi foundation of the Nation persisted as concrete fire walls versus the foreign indoctrination of the NIF/NCP MB rulers.
To understand this situation, we sketch the long-enduring structure of the Sufi life exemplified by the Ansar and the Khatmiya Muslim groups whose religious formulations provided the Umma and the DUP (the major coalition governments succeeding all democratic elections in Sudan) with incomparable sources of support since the early 1930s of the 20th century. Here, the lesson is that the future of a democratically unified Sudan might well hinge on the establishment of a strong political alliance between these two parties, rather than a coalition government that the NIF/NCP MB is most eager to make with them in 2010. In our opinion, such government would inevitably fall into the same authoritative rule the MB thus far exercised throughout the 1990s and the 2000s. The experience of a coalition government of these three parties in the late 1980s produced nothing but the notorious 1989’s MB extremist coup and dictatorial regime.
The Sufi-based Umma and DUP parties should live up to the requirements of removing the dangerous state of affairs of the Nation. Despite 20 years of exclusion from participation in the national decision making of the country, added to unfair representation in the CPA, the International Community must be aware that a stable future of Sudan will never come about without full restoration of the Umma/DUP moderate politics and the Muslim Sufi tolerance of the Sudanese cultural and political diversity. It is always important to ascertain the political impact of this reality with due reference to the results of the democratic elections of Sudan by geographical constituences. In 1958, the Umma won 57 seats and the Unionists [lately DUP] 14. In 1965, Umma received 76 out of 173 seats and the DUP 52. In 1986, the Umma won 97 of 207 seats in Constituent Assembly to form a coalition government with the DUP, the second largest group.
Skipping the vital roles the Old Sudan Umma/DUP large constituencies play in the national elections will always weaken the validity and the reliability of possible analyses of the situation, as it produces nothing but poor insights into the realities and the prospects of a smooth democratic transition in the whole country.
THE OLD SUDAN SUFI MUSLIMS
The aim of this article is to draw attention to the need to assess the influence of major political forces in the 2010 elections with a view to incite sufficient willingness from the part of Western Powers to earn the trust and confidence of the Sudanese in the process of enhancing international cooperation and friendship by diplomatic, trade, and cultural relations as determining factors in the world peace and progression. Interestingly, President Obama approach in his address to the Muslim World in Cairo (June 2009) made a fine example of this desirable action. Earlier, many Western thinkers, including Gouldner, Geertz, Eisenstadt, Rueschemeyer, Huntington, and the Lobbans, to mention a few, observed the top priority of Western foreign services to appreciate the religious beliefs, cultural settings, different languages, and the long list of social domains that characterized the identities of overseas nations differently from the Greek-based civilizations of the West.
Alvin Gouldner (1970: 5) put it eloquently in his masterpiece “The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology”: “The profound transformation of society that many radicals seek cannot be accomplished by political means alone; it cannot be confined to a purely political embodiment… the old society is not held together merely by force and violence, or experience and prudence. The old society maintains itself also through theories and ideologies that establish its harmony over the minds of men, who therefore do not merely bite their tongues but submit to it willingly. It will be impossible either to emancipate men from the old society or to build a humane new one, without beginning, here and now, the construction of a total counter-culture, including new social theories; and it is impossible to do this without a critique of the social theories dominant today.”
A major question, then, is pertinent to: 1) the preparedness of the Sudanese society to accomplish the wisdom of peaceful co-existence within two contradictory forms of the political life, i.e., a spiritual non-worldly order and a secular worldly system of international norms; and 2) the competencies of foreign powers to work with due respect to the cultural particularities and political realities of the country. This means that Western foreign powers, as well as the Arab League and the African Union, must play active roles in close consultation with the People of Sudan, not only the ruling parties, to help the transition to democratic rule.
The democratic opposition’s striving to voice grievances of the vast majority of people culminated in the successful meetings of the Juba Conference (September 2009), which allowed the Old Sudan Umma and DUP opposition groups to share with SAAG and the DMF to discuss key national strategies in conference to redress the CPA faltering implementation towards the overdue establishment of democratic transition and a real implementation of the right to self determination in the South, as well as autonomous rule in the other marginal regions.
Following the Juba Conference (Juba: September 2009), the Khatmiya Guide Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani announced unreserved support to the resolutions of the conference in which the Democratic National Forces (a political umbrella embodying the National Democratic Alliance, Umma, and other opposition groups) expressed irrevocable support to the right of the South to optional unity and the right of Darfur to enjoy peace and development vis-à-vis the MB brutalities and genocide, and the national consensus on a straightened population census and fair democratic elections, of which only the NIF/NCP MB was renegade.
Significantly, the Juba Conference unified the Nation’s willingness to enforce a principled implementation of the CPA that alone shall end the steeping failures geared and engineered by the MB dictatorship. The technically granted parliamentary veto to the NIF, which scored less than 20 percent of the national vote in the latest democratic elections in 1986 before occurrence of the June coup, has been consistently criticized as a source of continuous tensions between the opposition and the NIF/NCP-controlled government. The message is that CPA bilateral deals between the NIF/NCP and the SPLM should be democratically restructured to accommodate fair representation of the Sudanese political forces indiscriminately.
The Western World is not equally aware of this overriding fact, or perhaps the West is too slow to move efficiently to ally with Sufi Muslims, the most enduring social forces of North Sudan, the dynamic SAAG and DMF of the Sudan. The resistance of Sufi Muslims to the Brotherhood demagogic authority is a fact that has been permeating the social structure, the consciousness of masses, and the ever-increasing popular willingness to eliminate the alienating authority patterns the MB dictatorship initiated and developed in the state-society relationships for two consecutive decades by the continuous persecution of the Old Sudan reformists and the New Sudan revolutionaries.
THE MB FUTURE THREATS
The consequences of the NIF/NCP MB implementation of the CPA, however, revealed the breadth and depth of the political crisis the country is currently suffering as the MB insists on prolonging al-Bashir rule of terror: repressing the country unrelentingly; abusing the CPA to escalate tensions with the peace partner and the South Sudan Government; fixing the notorious security and intelligence apparatus and the Public Order Act; extending the MB authoritative rule beyond constitutional limits; and applying a series of illegal actions in the registration proceedings to monopolize the vote.
The MB political striving to monopolize political power will continue to pose a constant threat to the country’s regular democracy and just peace. The ruling party dictates to entrench anti-democratic traditions continued to terrorize both the Muslim and the non-Muslim populations by the consistent use of institutionalized intrusions in the free press, and the popular activities of civil society groups, irrespective of the CPA treaty and the Interim Constitution.
Added to gross violations of the right to religious belief specially for the non-Muslim population, the freedom of the press, and the other human rights and fundamental freedoms, anti-democratic campaigns never ceased to occur against the Ansar and the Khatmiyya, the SSAG, and the DMF who comprised a multiplicity of indigenous cultures and spiritual practices illegally curtailed in the North by the National Security and Intelligence Department (NSID), despite unauthorized jurisdiction by the Interim Constitution to exercise police powers. These uninterrupted decades of routine repression perpetuated gross abuses of authority against the cultural and religious life of people. Most importantly, incriminating fatawi [religious decrees] by the NIF Shura Council and ‘Ulama [jurist] Committees enjoyed unprecedented support by the government controlled-media to intimidate secular thinking and to apply continuous measures that terrorized the opposition and sterilized the free exchange of intellectual works.
Empowering the Brotherhood’s rank-and-file with this flagrant overriding of the Interim Constitution’s Bill of Rights, including security powers to a variety of non-professional demagogic supporters, has already jeopardized the essential fairness of the scheduled national elections in April 2010. Not only that the fatawi condemned university professors or civil society activists with blasphemy for simply opposing the government’s policies and practices in all spheres of the social and political life; but the MB ‘ulama controlled hundreds of mosques with regular preaching against secular thought and the need to support the “Islamic authorities” against the “enemies of Islam.” Most recently, however, brave Imams of Sufi Islam in Khartoum and other cities criticized publicly the MB authorities and asked for justice and fairness in all processes of national elections.
The failure of the NIF/NCP MB theological state to boost the economic and political development of the country does not mean that the MB incompetency has been completely exhausted, or that they might surrender to an alternative democracy. The MB might perhaps live as a religious social group much longer than the Bashir NIF/NCP ruling or the NIF/NCP split group which joined the opposition ranks as soon as it was removed from government. Unlike the NIF/NCP state beneficiary (1978-1985, 1989 to the present), the MB developed ideological and political support among college students, businesses, and several professional groups since the mid-fifties that, supported by government security and administrative authorities, never ceased to use violence against civil society groups. The MB has adequately maintained social existence in the urban quarters of cities, besides modest influence amongst the non-secular communities of the Bedouin side of the country that had been largely controlled still are by the Ansar and the Khatmiya.
Remarkably limited in size and scope, the MB might never be able to compete largely with the Khatmiya or the Ansar Sufi constituencies in democratic elections, let alone replacing them via non-democratic alliance with the June army officers. A pro-terrorist group, notwithstanding, the MB will always beg for political control by state power rather than democratic competition. Most likely, new terrorist leaderships, including non-Sudanese elements, might emerge in non-democratic alliances inside the Sudan with armed groups that yearn to control civil society by the repressive power of the state versus the voluntary will of civilian population, in spite of the CPA prospects for peace and stable democracy.
The Khatmiya and the Ansar communities have persistently maintained social and religious structures independently from state control, at the time serious political divisions wracked the political parties of the UP and the DUP. True, dictatorial attacks never ceased against popular Islam since independence. Led by MB groups in and outside Sudan, the most recent attempt to dismantle the Ansar/UP and the Khatmiya/DUP entities has completely failed to “inherit” the powerful machinery of these groups by decree.
The NIF war-mongering state managers have feverishly persecuted the Ansar and the Khatmiya, sometimes more than the UP or the DUP, to undermine the Sufi Muslims’ long-enduring self-sufficient economic, spiritual, and ideological existence in the social life. In this destructive process, the authoritative rulers used both containment and exclusionary policies to subdue the Ansar/Khatmiya popular institutions, to no avail. This failure is related to the fact that the Sudanese Muslim society has consistently condemned the state attempts that abused the country’s human resources and national wealth to establish artificial bodies to undermine community organizations, or to control popular voluntary activities.
The NIF/NCP tyrannous rule converted the small portion of the Sudan MB to one of the wealthiest sections of the population by the direct use of government monies and the confiscation of opposition property. The immediate result of these ill-practices reflected in the reduction of the UP-DUP financial power in the market and the impoverishment of large sections of the Khatmiya and the Ansar businesspeople, as well as their farming and working forces. Updated studies indicated the great economic and financial loss of the “traditional conservative business groups” in the production and business sectors to the MB government-supported businesses throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s.
In the recent 2000s, the constitutional office of the Auditor-General’s Chamber charged the central government, top public service employees, and several private companies with annual embezzlements of the public money in billions of dollars (see shro-cairoupdated.org). Moreover, escalated disputes erupted repeatedly between the CPA peace partner, the SPLM ruling party in the South, and the NIF/NCP government about the oil sales and returns. In this respect, the World Bank (2008) noted that, “While the discovery and exploitation of oil resources has facilitated an increase in national wealth, it has also brought a myriad of problems.”
THE FAILURES OF MB REPRESSION
The miserable failure of the MB international movement to indoctrinate the Sudanese society with the MB political ideology should analytically help to separate clearly between the authoritative doctrine of the MB to suppress society by state powers on the one hand, and the daily exercise of religious faith as a fundamental human right exercised by the Ansar, the Khatmiya, and the other Sufi sects as well as the Muslim groups not subscribing in compliance with the structure and functioning of popular Islam to the MB fundamentalist doctrine or their partisan State theology that attempts to govern the whole population by religious discrimination.
While the UP and the DUP party conferences in and outside the country acknowledged the necessity of implementing a national constitution to guarantee the freedom of religious belief as urgent political agenda, the UP and the DUP dissident elements cooperated with the NIF government to subdue the Ansar, the Khatmiya, and the other opposition groups only to fall prey to un-resolvable disputes with large sections of the masses that did not want them to collaborate with the NIF rulers. The few elements of the UP-DUP that became presidential advisers, governors of wilayat [states or provinces], junior state ministers, or winners of some business deals in the service of the NIF rule might have unwittingly helped the Umma/DUP to clear their rank and file of the NIF supporters infiltrating their political or religious bodies.
One of the main results of the NIF failures to override the Sudanese popular institutions was that the Sudanese Sufi groups held strongly to the traditional leadership of the Ansar and the Khatmiya, regardless of the deteriorating economic and financial situation of the sects. Notwithstanding, the Old Sudan Ansar and the Khatmiya institutions, the SAAG, and MDF must be financially supported to be able to compete with the NIF/NCP MB monopolies over both state and market businesses.
Another obvious result was that the NIF policies and practices to succeed the leadership of these large communities by state violence have been neatly defeated, judged by the sustainable independence of the Umma/DUP, SAGG, and DMF from the NIF/NCP MB state monopolies, and the mounting opposition to the MB state and party by students, professionals, and many other working groups, women and men, of whom a majority belongs to the Sufi Muslim groups and the opposition parties against the NIF all over the country. A third result is that the Ansar and the Khatmiya solid representation of popular Islam prevailed consistently over the NIF/NCP MB Iranian-modeled authoritative rule.
If consistently encouraged, the Ansar and the Khatmiya Sufi Islam would survive in strong alliances with the secular forces of Sudan in the post-democratic transition rather than those alliances previously experienced under the MB unpopular order. The MB doctrine works strictly in deep hatred of both western democracy and the Sudanese Sufi Islam and cultural traditions that have been symbolically represented and politically acceptable by the two Old Sudan parties, besides alliances with the SSAG and DMF. The Sufi Islam of the Khatmiya and the Ansar is firmly grounded on a liberal life that had been closely coexisting with western democracy and capitalist democracy for long decades since the closing years of colonial times.
The Ansar, the Khatmiya, the Umma, and the DUP shared increasing national interests with several partners of the secular umbrella of the NDA, notably the communist party, the SPLM, the non-governmental unions and professional associations, the East groups, and the Darfur civilians and armed groups versus the NIF common enemy. In our opinion, these opposition groups might make partial alliances with one another in the elections and the post-elections Sudan. All in all, however, they will continue to struggle, in principle, to stop the NIF/NCP BM state managers from transgressing the right of self-determination, regional autonomous rule, and the other basic public freedoms and fundamental rights.
CONCLUSIONS
In the light of the NIF repressive policies, it might be predicted that the Sudanese current struggles to establish the regular democracy and the permanent and just peace would either end up successfully, or that, regrettably, the NIF/NCP tyrannous rule might engage the country in a renewed eruption of civil war with a strong possibility of regional and international intervention, which could possibly transcend the South-North conflict to the detriment of the continental, inter-continental, and world peace.
To strengthen the positive possibility of a successful democratic transition to an era of post-elections permanent peace and sustainable development, let us repeat the call voiced in the Juba Conference (2009) on the NIF/NCP government by the National Front, the NDA, SPLM, UP-DUP, Darfur civilian and military groups, and civil society organizations to establish an all-Sudanese government to run the next elections. Furthermore, these political forces, including the NIF/NCP MB government, must improve democratic performance and organizational structures to be prepared for the elections and the post-elections era.
A significant step to facilitate this program is for the Ansar and the Khatmiya leaderships to take effective steps to democratize the structural relationships of their organizational activities to touch more deeply upon the general popular movement of their political allies, the democratic modernist parties including the SAAG and DMF versus the NIF/NCP MB extremism and political repression.
To allow Sufi Islam as a vital structural component of the cultural heritage of the Muslim population to act strongly in favor of democracy, all systems of rule, regardless of their ideological or political orientation, must comply with the Bill of Rights and the other constitutional provisions that guarantee the full enjoyment of civil, political, economic, and cultural rights to all citizens, indiscriminately. To facilitate this democratic transformation, the Sudanese ruling systems must fully adhere to the right of people to select freely their own leaderships and organizational settings.
While this writer appreciates the concerns of some thinkers to establish democratic governance by periodical succession, the fundamental principle of democracy, i.e., the people’s voluntary will to keep in office whoever they wish to govern their public affairs, should not give way to the necessary emphasis on periodical succession. This fact applies to the succession issue in most African nations. It is only when the elected leader decides to step down within a legal period of office that the electorate would find another leader. With more implementation of democratic rules on the basis of this fundamental principle, the Sudanese people will certainly enjoy voluntarily greater levels of democracy than those thus far attained.
* The author is a sociologist at the Department of Social Work & Sociology in Tennessee State University, Nashville TN, USA. He can be reached at emehawari@hotmail.com
The Rest @ Sudan Tribune
A counter islamist move would be to support these Sufi groups as they challenge the Sharia imposed on them.
What NOT to do:
- Directly Help: The Sufi are not friends of the West, and many groups believe the West's values are evil. They are unlikely to accept any direct assistance from any Western Connections.
- Assume the Sufi are of one mind: The Sufi are a globally diverse group, ranging from near secular animists to devote Muslim Mystics.
What can be done
- Understand that the issues of each Sufi group are local. Their Islam is highly integrated with the local land, events and culture.
- Any actions, events or resources that give the Sufi freedom to practice their own, local, Sufi Islam will put up a new barrier to the Muslim Brotherhood's effort to Radicalize them.
- Create a complete list of Sufi Groups in Islamist Target States, starting with Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Benin, Ghanan, Angola, Malawi, and South Africa, including local leadership structures.
- Identify the local issues important to each local group.
- Create an Inventory of Salafi youth and mission movements sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood which target Africa. A good starting list is found in the pages of "Alms for Jihad"
- Support local governments with the intelligence so they can identify key groups and individuals as they enter the country.
- Track the local and individuals with whom these groups meet.
- Attend and listen to what is taught by these people as guests in the Mosques
- Note Especially those who work with local youth.
Help local governments create locally appropriate strategies to illustrate the Sharia put in place by the Islamists, and the impact that it will have on the Sufi Muslim.
The analysis that follows is a recent deconstruction of the past failures of the Muslim Brother Hood in their efforts to convert Sudanese Sufi Muslims with Safafi Dawa. It serves to illustrate my points.
-Shimron Issachar
By Mahgoub El-Tigani
November 13, 2009 – The issues concerning our Nation these days are multi-faceted: (effective ending of the escalated crisis in Darfur to the advantage of the victimized population of the region; democratic transition by fair elections and consensual security measures; faithful procession of the optional unity referendum; due prosecution and eradication of the government’s self-incited corruption; and continuous principled application of the unfulfilled agenda of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) by restructured workable relations with the Sudanese opposition forces and the International Community, especially the United States and the International Criminal Court, among many other national and international concerns).
Politicians have already burdened their agenda with the issue of national elections as a key factor to complete the transition to democratic rule. Political sociologists, including this writer, however, are more concerned with the structural situation of the country, namely the possibilities of harmonizing the North-South state relations to end increasing tensions in the level of state authority and the constitutional jurisdictions of state-managers. But the roles to be played by opposition groups and the International Community are indeed prominent: The latter entities, opposition and internationals, would have to work closely with both Federal (Central) Government and the South Sudan Government to bring about a flexible formula to accomplish the outstanding agenda for the ongoing democratic transition.
A fact often left out in the political formulae of the country’s state of affairs, nevertheless, is that both opposition groups and the International Community would have to consider seriously the urgent need to appreciate indigenous components of the formula in terms of two realities: 1) The Old Society of Sudan led by the Sufi large traditional forces in the North, and 2) the New Sudan’s aspiring groups [of which the anti-democratic extremist NIF/NCP MB ruling party is de facto authority body] the Self-Autonomy Armed Groups (SAAG) chiefly the SPLM, as well as Darfur and the East self-autonomy armed groups manifested a different path of political development in the light of the CPA.
Uniquely different from both groups, the 1930s-2000s Democratic Modern Forces (DMF), namely the secular trades unions, liberal political parties, and voluntary human rights and democracy groups, constituted an independent political category that has consistently forced an independent path of development in the state and society relations. At this point, it is worthy to mention the genius efforts Joseph Garang, the first minister of the newly-established South Affairs Ministry, exerted in the late 1960s to boost DMF relationships in the two parts of the Nation.
The SAAG has shown in the post-CPA years (2005-9) mounting influence in the public life as they evolved in the regions with significant connections in the national and the international space. Except for the NIF/NCP MB hegemony over the State and the national economy, which has been further characterized by financial corruption, abuses of authority (up to the most recent partisan intrusions in the elections’ registration process), and an unprecedented record of human rights violations, the SAAG leading the South, East, and Darfur regions has not yet offered clear democratic styles of governance; instead, they often acted in reaction to the NIF/NCP offensive practices.
Of particular significance, the national and the international media and diplomacy have largely defaulted in appreciating the key issue of highlighting the Old Sudan statuses and roles before and after the CPA and in the future affairs of the country. Because our post-independence national elections revealed the persistent influence of the Umma and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) traditional parties as leading constituencies in the democratic national elections, we will discus briefly the situation of the Old Sudan popular constituencies, which based on Sufi Islam remain the sole real competitor of the NIF/NCP state-supported party in the northern, eastern, western, and central regions of North Sudan.
THE SUDANESE INDIGENOUS MUSLIMS
The international media and diplomacy must first of all recognize that the significance of Islam for the social life of the majority Muslim populations is omnipotent. Over long centuries of cultural and religious adaptations with the deeply rooted African origins of the Nation, the Sudanese society has creatively incorporated principal teachings of Islam, whatever adoptable, in accordance with African cultures and social structures. The only doctrines that most competently contained such adoptions were those of the Sufi traditions of the Sunni Islam that exerted a great effort by their founding jurists to be part of the Sudanese-African belief systems, the prevalent administrative and political self-autonomous arrangements (as in the Darfur agricultural hakorat), and the matrilineal family relations that carried with them tremendous respect to the women as well as the extended family/tribal solidarity communalities in the context of an overwhelming Bedouin and agrarian norms of the social life.
Since the advent of Islam and its peaceful penetration in the indigenous life of the 5-centuries old Nubia Christendom’s, the politics of the country have been firmly founded on this socio-religious amalgam, which is most articulated in the Sufi traditions of the North. This writer disagrees with the opinion that the Sudanese Islam was solely brought into the country by famous Egyptian, Iraqi, and Moroccan jurists. The impact of the Nubian Christians, the inhabitants of the land that basically adopted Islam, and their once-committed clergy of the Church, as well as the influences of Sudanese African cultures, were major sources of the rituals, spiritualities, and beliefs of the post-Christian Sufi traditions together with the worshipping and transactional jurisprudence of classical Islam. The most important inherited authority that documented this fact indirectly by its own unique style was the Tabaqat of Sheikh Mohamed Daif-Allah which reflected a massive mythology of the Sudanese medieval African, Christian, and Islamic heritages. This research area is unnecessarily neglected, although it reveals significant aspects of Sudanese personality and Sufi Islam.
The Sudanese Sufi Islam’s glorious tendencies of peaceful co-existence, equalitarianism, tolerance of social differences, and emphasis on humanitarian relations was nothing but a huge product of the African-Christian-Islamic merges of the country’s cultures and beliefs. In the colonial and the post-independence times, even the secular DMF collaborated openly with prevailing Sufi traditions of the Nation that pervaded both the Muslim and the non-Muslim communities of the North, in particular, in religious, social, and political terms. Still in the South, small groups in the provincial towns exercised the Khatmiya, Ansar, and other Sufi traditions, thus maintaining political commitments to the Umma and the DUP political parties rather than acquiring memberships of the southerner political groups. Besides the warring environment by a prolonged civil war, the lacking of large urban and industrial settings, moreover, precluded the spread of DMF in the villages and towns of the South.
THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) did not share the same concerns of the Sufi traditions of Sudan. Influenced by the foreign thought of Egyptian, Iranian, and other fundamentalist doctrines, the Brotherhood was destined to align with governments and authorities rather than the Sufi groups throughout the MB experiences with the state and society. Early in the October Revolution 1964, the MB leadership supported the generals of the defunct November 1957-64 dictatorship to enable them to escape legal prosecution. Repeatedly in the 1970s and 1980s of the Nimeiri era, the MB cooperated with the falling regime to inherit almost all its ruling apparatuses only to persecute people.
Later in the April Uprising 1985, the MB collaborated with the Transitional Military Council to ensure political dominance over the upcoming national elections and the ensuing Constituent Assembly. But the biggest victory of the MB striving to monopolize power and wealth was achieved evidently by the June coup 1983 by which the MB monopolized state powers to favor an Islamic Project supported vehemently by international allies in Iran and other Middle East societies. The face of the Sudanese politics indicates prolonged control by the MB over state politics, even after the CPA. Still, the societal conditions, intellectual resistance, and above all Sufi foundation of the Nation persisted as concrete fire walls versus the foreign indoctrination of the NIF/NCP MB rulers.
To understand this situation, we sketch the long-enduring structure of the Sufi life exemplified by the Ansar and the Khatmiya Muslim groups whose religious formulations provided the Umma and the DUP (the major coalition governments succeeding all democratic elections in Sudan) with incomparable sources of support since the early 1930s of the 20th century. Here, the lesson is that the future of a democratically unified Sudan might well hinge on the establishment of a strong political alliance between these two parties, rather than a coalition government that the NIF/NCP MB is most eager to make with them in 2010. In our opinion, such government would inevitably fall into the same authoritative rule the MB thus far exercised throughout the 1990s and the 2000s. The experience of a coalition government of these three parties in the late 1980s produced nothing but the notorious 1989’s MB extremist coup and dictatorial regime.
The Sufi-based Umma and DUP parties should live up to the requirements of removing the dangerous state of affairs of the Nation. Despite 20 years of exclusion from participation in the national decision making of the country, added to unfair representation in the CPA, the International Community must be aware that a stable future of Sudan will never come about without full restoration of the Umma/DUP moderate politics and the Muslim Sufi tolerance of the Sudanese cultural and political diversity. It is always important to ascertain the political impact of this reality with due reference to the results of the democratic elections of Sudan by geographical constituences. In 1958, the Umma won 57 seats and the Unionists [lately DUP] 14. In 1965, Umma received 76 out of 173 seats and the DUP 52. In 1986, the Umma won 97 of 207 seats in Constituent Assembly to form a coalition government with the DUP, the second largest group.
Skipping the vital roles the Old Sudan Umma/DUP large constituencies play in the national elections will always weaken the validity and the reliability of possible analyses of the situation, as it produces nothing but poor insights into the realities and the prospects of a smooth democratic transition in the whole country.
THE OLD SUDAN SUFI MUSLIMS
The aim of this article is to draw attention to the need to assess the influence of major political forces in the 2010 elections with a view to incite sufficient willingness from the part of Western Powers to earn the trust and confidence of the Sudanese in the process of enhancing international cooperation and friendship by diplomatic, trade, and cultural relations as determining factors in the world peace and progression. Interestingly, President Obama approach in his address to the Muslim World in Cairo (June 2009) made a fine example of this desirable action. Earlier, many Western thinkers, including Gouldner, Geertz, Eisenstadt, Rueschemeyer, Huntington, and the Lobbans, to mention a few, observed the top priority of Western foreign services to appreciate the religious beliefs, cultural settings, different languages, and the long list of social domains that characterized the identities of overseas nations differently from the Greek-based civilizations of the West.
Alvin Gouldner (1970: 5) put it eloquently in his masterpiece “The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology”: “The profound transformation of society that many radicals seek cannot be accomplished by political means alone; it cannot be confined to a purely political embodiment… the old society is not held together merely by force and violence, or experience and prudence. The old society maintains itself also through theories and ideologies that establish its harmony over the minds of men, who therefore do not merely bite their tongues but submit to it willingly. It will be impossible either to emancipate men from the old society or to build a humane new one, without beginning, here and now, the construction of a total counter-culture, including new social theories; and it is impossible to do this without a critique of the social theories dominant today.”
A major question, then, is pertinent to: 1) the preparedness of the Sudanese society to accomplish the wisdom of peaceful co-existence within two contradictory forms of the political life, i.e., a spiritual non-worldly order and a secular worldly system of international norms; and 2) the competencies of foreign powers to work with due respect to the cultural particularities and political realities of the country. This means that Western foreign powers, as well as the Arab League and the African Union, must play active roles in close consultation with the People of Sudan, not only the ruling parties, to help the transition to democratic rule.
The democratic opposition’s striving to voice grievances of the vast majority of people culminated in the successful meetings of the Juba Conference (September 2009), which allowed the Old Sudan Umma and DUP opposition groups to share with SAAG and the DMF to discuss key national strategies in conference to redress the CPA faltering implementation towards the overdue establishment of democratic transition and a real implementation of the right to self determination in the South, as well as autonomous rule in the other marginal regions.
Following the Juba Conference (Juba: September 2009), the Khatmiya Guide Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani announced unreserved support to the resolutions of the conference in which the Democratic National Forces (a political umbrella embodying the National Democratic Alliance, Umma, and other opposition groups) expressed irrevocable support to the right of the South to optional unity and the right of Darfur to enjoy peace and development vis-à-vis the MB brutalities and genocide, and the national consensus on a straightened population census and fair democratic elections, of which only the NIF/NCP MB was renegade.
Significantly, the Juba Conference unified the Nation’s willingness to enforce a principled implementation of the CPA that alone shall end the steeping failures geared and engineered by the MB dictatorship. The technically granted parliamentary veto to the NIF, which scored less than 20 percent of the national vote in the latest democratic elections in 1986 before occurrence of the June coup, has been consistently criticized as a source of continuous tensions between the opposition and the NIF/NCP-controlled government. The message is that CPA bilateral deals between the NIF/NCP and the SPLM should be democratically restructured to accommodate fair representation of the Sudanese political forces indiscriminately.
The Western World is not equally aware of this overriding fact, or perhaps the West is too slow to move efficiently to ally with Sufi Muslims, the most enduring social forces of North Sudan, the dynamic SAAG and DMF of the Sudan. The resistance of Sufi Muslims to the Brotherhood demagogic authority is a fact that has been permeating the social structure, the consciousness of masses, and the ever-increasing popular willingness to eliminate the alienating authority patterns the MB dictatorship initiated and developed in the state-society relationships for two consecutive decades by the continuous persecution of the Old Sudan reformists and the New Sudan revolutionaries.
THE MB FUTURE THREATS
The consequences of the NIF/NCP MB implementation of the CPA, however, revealed the breadth and depth of the political crisis the country is currently suffering as the MB insists on prolonging al-Bashir rule of terror: repressing the country unrelentingly; abusing the CPA to escalate tensions with the peace partner and the South Sudan Government; fixing the notorious security and intelligence apparatus and the Public Order Act; extending the MB authoritative rule beyond constitutional limits; and applying a series of illegal actions in the registration proceedings to monopolize the vote.
The MB political striving to monopolize political power will continue to pose a constant threat to the country’s regular democracy and just peace. The ruling party dictates to entrench anti-democratic traditions continued to terrorize both the Muslim and the non-Muslim populations by the consistent use of institutionalized intrusions in the free press, and the popular activities of civil society groups, irrespective of the CPA treaty and the Interim Constitution.
Added to gross violations of the right to religious belief specially for the non-Muslim population, the freedom of the press, and the other human rights and fundamental freedoms, anti-democratic campaigns never ceased to occur against the Ansar and the Khatmiyya, the SSAG, and the DMF who comprised a multiplicity of indigenous cultures and spiritual practices illegally curtailed in the North by the National Security and Intelligence Department (NSID), despite unauthorized jurisdiction by the Interim Constitution to exercise police powers. These uninterrupted decades of routine repression perpetuated gross abuses of authority against the cultural and religious life of people. Most importantly, incriminating fatawi [religious decrees] by the NIF Shura Council and ‘Ulama [jurist] Committees enjoyed unprecedented support by the government controlled-media to intimidate secular thinking and to apply continuous measures that terrorized the opposition and sterilized the free exchange of intellectual works.
Empowering the Brotherhood’s rank-and-file with this flagrant overriding of the Interim Constitution’s Bill of Rights, including security powers to a variety of non-professional demagogic supporters, has already jeopardized the essential fairness of the scheduled national elections in April 2010. Not only that the fatawi condemned university professors or civil society activists with blasphemy for simply opposing the government’s policies and practices in all spheres of the social and political life; but the MB ‘ulama controlled hundreds of mosques with regular preaching against secular thought and the need to support the “Islamic authorities” against the “enemies of Islam.” Most recently, however, brave Imams of Sufi Islam in Khartoum and other cities criticized publicly the MB authorities and asked for justice and fairness in all processes of national elections.
The failure of the NIF/NCP MB theological state to boost the economic and political development of the country does not mean that the MB incompetency has been completely exhausted, or that they might surrender to an alternative democracy. The MB might perhaps live as a religious social group much longer than the Bashir NIF/NCP ruling or the NIF/NCP split group which joined the opposition ranks as soon as it was removed from government. Unlike the NIF/NCP state beneficiary (1978-1985, 1989 to the present), the MB developed ideological and political support among college students, businesses, and several professional groups since the mid-fifties that, supported by government security and administrative authorities, never ceased to use violence against civil society groups. The MB has adequately maintained social existence in the urban quarters of cities, besides modest influence amongst the non-secular communities of the Bedouin side of the country that had been largely controlled still are by the Ansar and the Khatmiya.
Remarkably limited in size and scope, the MB might never be able to compete largely with the Khatmiya or the Ansar Sufi constituencies in democratic elections, let alone replacing them via non-democratic alliance with the June army officers. A pro-terrorist group, notwithstanding, the MB will always beg for political control by state power rather than democratic competition. Most likely, new terrorist leaderships, including non-Sudanese elements, might emerge in non-democratic alliances inside the Sudan with armed groups that yearn to control civil society by the repressive power of the state versus the voluntary will of civilian population, in spite of the CPA prospects for peace and stable democracy.
The Khatmiya and the Ansar communities have persistently maintained social and religious structures independently from state control, at the time serious political divisions wracked the political parties of the UP and the DUP. True, dictatorial attacks never ceased against popular Islam since independence. Led by MB groups in and outside Sudan, the most recent attempt to dismantle the Ansar/UP and the Khatmiya/DUP entities has completely failed to “inherit” the powerful machinery of these groups by decree.
The NIF war-mongering state managers have feverishly persecuted the Ansar and the Khatmiya, sometimes more than the UP or the DUP, to undermine the Sufi Muslims’ long-enduring self-sufficient economic, spiritual, and ideological existence in the social life. In this destructive process, the authoritative rulers used both containment and exclusionary policies to subdue the Ansar/Khatmiya popular institutions, to no avail. This failure is related to the fact that the Sudanese Muslim society has consistently condemned the state attempts that abused the country’s human resources and national wealth to establish artificial bodies to undermine community organizations, or to control popular voluntary activities.
The NIF/NCP tyrannous rule converted the small portion of the Sudan MB to one of the wealthiest sections of the population by the direct use of government monies and the confiscation of opposition property. The immediate result of these ill-practices reflected in the reduction of the UP-DUP financial power in the market and the impoverishment of large sections of the Khatmiya and the Ansar businesspeople, as well as their farming and working forces. Updated studies indicated the great economic and financial loss of the “traditional conservative business groups” in the production and business sectors to the MB government-supported businesses throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s.
In the recent 2000s, the constitutional office of the Auditor-General’s Chamber charged the central government, top public service employees, and several private companies with annual embezzlements of the public money in billions of dollars (see shro-cairoupdated.org). Moreover, escalated disputes erupted repeatedly between the CPA peace partner, the SPLM ruling party in the South, and the NIF/NCP government about the oil sales and returns. In this respect, the World Bank (2008) noted that, “While the discovery and exploitation of oil resources has facilitated an increase in national wealth, it has also brought a myriad of problems.”
THE FAILURES OF MB REPRESSION
The miserable failure of the MB international movement to indoctrinate the Sudanese society with the MB political ideology should analytically help to separate clearly between the authoritative doctrine of the MB to suppress society by state powers on the one hand, and the daily exercise of religious faith as a fundamental human right exercised by the Ansar, the Khatmiya, and the other Sufi sects as well as the Muslim groups not subscribing in compliance with the structure and functioning of popular Islam to the MB fundamentalist doctrine or their partisan State theology that attempts to govern the whole population by religious discrimination.
While the UP and the DUP party conferences in and outside the country acknowledged the necessity of implementing a national constitution to guarantee the freedom of religious belief as urgent political agenda, the UP and the DUP dissident elements cooperated with the NIF government to subdue the Ansar, the Khatmiya, and the other opposition groups only to fall prey to un-resolvable disputes with large sections of the masses that did not want them to collaborate with the NIF rulers. The few elements of the UP-DUP that became presidential advisers, governors of wilayat [states or provinces], junior state ministers, or winners of some business deals in the service of the NIF rule might have unwittingly helped the Umma/DUP to clear their rank and file of the NIF supporters infiltrating their political or religious bodies.
One of the main results of the NIF failures to override the Sudanese popular institutions was that the Sudanese Sufi groups held strongly to the traditional leadership of the Ansar and the Khatmiya, regardless of the deteriorating economic and financial situation of the sects. Notwithstanding, the Old Sudan Ansar and the Khatmiya institutions, the SAAG, and MDF must be financially supported to be able to compete with the NIF/NCP MB monopolies over both state and market businesses.
Another obvious result was that the NIF policies and practices to succeed the leadership of these large communities by state violence have been neatly defeated, judged by the sustainable independence of the Umma/DUP, SAGG, and DMF from the NIF/NCP MB state monopolies, and the mounting opposition to the MB state and party by students, professionals, and many other working groups, women and men, of whom a majority belongs to the Sufi Muslim groups and the opposition parties against the NIF all over the country. A third result is that the Ansar and the Khatmiya solid representation of popular Islam prevailed consistently over the NIF/NCP MB Iranian-modeled authoritative rule.
If consistently encouraged, the Ansar and the Khatmiya Sufi Islam would survive in strong alliances with the secular forces of Sudan in the post-democratic transition rather than those alliances previously experienced under the MB unpopular order. The MB doctrine works strictly in deep hatred of both western democracy and the Sudanese Sufi Islam and cultural traditions that have been symbolically represented and politically acceptable by the two Old Sudan parties, besides alliances with the SSAG and DMF. The Sufi Islam of the Khatmiya and the Ansar is firmly grounded on a liberal life that had been closely coexisting with western democracy and capitalist democracy for long decades since the closing years of colonial times.
The Ansar, the Khatmiya, the Umma, and the DUP shared increasing national interests with several partners of the secular umbrella of the NDA, notably the communist party, the SPLM, the non-governmental unions and professional associations, the East groups, and the Darfur civilians and armed groups versus the NIF common enemy. In our opinion, these opposition groups might make partial alliances with one another in the elections and the post-elections Sudan. All in all, however, they will continue to struggle, in principle, to stop the NIF/NCP BM state managers from transgressing the right of self-determination, regional autonomous rule, and the other basic public freedoms and fundamental rights.
CONCLUSIONS
In the light of the NIF repressive policies, it might be predicted that the Sudanese current struggles to establish the regular democracy and the permanent and just peace would either end up successfully, or that, regrettably, the NIF/NCP tyrannous rule might engage the country in a renewed eruption of civil war with a strong possibility of regional and international intervention, which could possibly transcend the South-North conflict to the detriment of the continental, inter-continental, and world peace.
To strengthen the positive possibility of a successful democratic transition to an era of post-elections permanent peace and sustainable development, let us repeat the call voiced in the Juba Conference (2009) on the NIF/NCP government by the National Front, the NDA, SPLM, UP-DUP, Darfur civilian and military groups, and civil society organizations to establish an all-Sudanese government to run the next elections. Furthermore, these political forces, including the NIF/NCP MB government, must improve democratic performance and organizational structures to be prepared for the elections and the post-elections era.
A significant step to facilitate this program is for the Ansar and the Khatmiya leaderships to take effective steps to democratize the structural relationships of their organizational activities to touch more deeply upon the general popular movement of their political allies, the democratic modernist parties including the SAAG and DMF versus the NIF/NCP MB extremism and political repression.
To allow Sufi Islam as a vital structural component of the cultural heritage of the Muslim population to act strongly in favor of democracy, all systems of rule, regardless of their ideological or political orientation, must comply with the Bill of Rights and the other constitutional provisions that guarantee the full enjoyment of civil, political, economic, and cultural rights to all citizens, indiscriminately. To facilitate this democratic transformation, the Sudanese ruling systems must fully adhere to the right of people to select freely their own leaderships and organizational settings.
While this writer appreciates the concerns of some thinkers to establish democratic governance by periodical succession, the fundamental principle of democracy, i.e., the people’s voluntary will to keep in office whoever they wish to govern their public affairs, should not give way to the necessary emphasis on periodical succession. This fact applies to the succession issue in most African nations. It is only when the elected leader decides to step down within a legal period of office that the electorate would find another leader. With more implementation of democratic rules on the basis of this fundamental principle, the Sudanese people will certainly enjoy voluntarily greater levels of democracy than those thus far attained.
* The author is a sociologist at the Department of Social Work & Sociology in Tennessee State University, Nashville TN, USA. He can be reached at emehawari@hotmail.com
The Rest @ Sudan Tribune
DRC Slips Further in Chaos
- Gold miners in the northeast of the Democratic Republic of Congo : Thousands of kilograms of gold are moved out of the country illegally each year .
- Congolese Rebels Laundering Money in Germany, UN Report Reveals
Spiegel Online - Berlin,Germany . The FDLR "has a far-reaching diaspora network involved in the day-to-day running of the movement; coordination of military and arms-trafficking activities ... - UN peacekeepers have failed in DRC as rebels strengthen positions
Radio France Internationale - Paris,France , the coordination of military and arms-trafficking activities and the management of financial activities," according to the report. ... - Boat seized smuggling Somali arms into Yemen
Yemen News Agency - Yemen The Intelligence authorities were monitoring the movement of the boat since it originated in the Horn of Africa country carrying an arms shipment over the ... - Congo Army Helps Rebels Get Arms, UN FindsNew York Times - New York,NY,USA... in the day-to-day running of the movement; the coordination of military and arms-trafficking activities and the management of financial activities. ...
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
Shabaab Recruiters Indicted in the US
Department of Justice
Office of Public Affairs
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASEMonday, November 23, 2009
Terror Charges Unsealed in Minneapolis Against Eight Men, Justice Department Announces
Terrorism charges have been unsealed today in the District of Minnesota against eight defendants.
According to the charging documents, the offenses include
Office of Public Affairs
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASEMonday, November 23, 2009
Terror Charges Unsealed in Minneapolis Against Eight Men, Justice Department Announces
Terrorism charges have been unsealed today in the District of Minnesota against eight defendants.
According to the charging documents, the offenses include
- Providing financial support to those who traveled to Somalia to fight on behalf of al-Shabaab, a designated foreign terrorist organization;
- Attending terrorist training camps operated by al-Shabaab;
- Fighting on behalf of al-Shabaab.
Thus far, 14 defendants have been charged in the District of Minnesota through indictments or criminal complaints that have been unsealed and brought in connection with an ongoing investigation into the recruitment of persons from U.S. communities to train with or fight on behalf of extremist groups in Somalia. Four of these defendants have previously pleaded guilty and await sentencing.
The charges were announced today by David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; B. Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for the District of Minneapolis; and Ralph S. Boelter, Special Agent in Charge of the Minneapolis field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
"The recruitment of young people from Minneapolis and other U.S. communities to fight for extremists in Somalia has been the focus of intense investigation for many months," Assistant Attorney General Kris said. "While the charges unsealed today underscore our progress to date, this investigation is ongoing. Those who sign up to fight or recruit for al-Shabaab’s terror network should be aware that they may well end up as defendants in the United States or casualties of the Somali conflict."
Background
According to court documents,
- between September 2007 and October 2009, approximately 20 young men, all but one of Somali descent, left the Minneapolis area and traveled to Somalia, where they trained with al-Shabaab, a designated terrorist organization.
- Many of them ultimately fought with al-Shabaab against Ethiopian forces, African Union troops, and the internationally-supported Transitional Federal Government (TFG).
- Court documents also state that the first group of six men traveled to Somalia in December 2007. Prior to their departure, the six men, as well as others in the Minneapolis area, raised money for the trips and held meetings in which they made phone calls to alleged co-conspirators in Somalia.
- Upon arriving in Somalia, the men from Minneapolis allegedly stayed at safe-houses in Somalia and attended an al-Shabaab training camp.
- The al-Shabaab training camp included dozens of other young ethnic Somalis from Somalia, elsewhere in Africa, Europe and the United States.
- Purportedly, the trainees were trained by, among others, Somali, Arab and Western instructors in the use of small arms, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and military-style tactics.
- Allegedly, the trainees also were indoctrinated with anti-Ethiopian, anti-American, anti-Israeli and anti-Western beliefs.
According to court documents, on Oct. 29, 2008, Shirwa Ahmed, one of the men who left Minnesota in December 2007 and attended the al-Shabaab training camp, took part in one of five simultaneous suicide attacks on targets in northern Somalia. The attacks appeared to have been coordinated. Shirwa Mohamud Ahmed, also known as "Shirwa," drove an explosive-laden Toyota truck into an office of the Puntland Intelligence Service in Bossasso, Puntland.
Other targets included a second Puntland Intelligence Service Office in Bossasso, the Presidential Palace, the United Nations Development Program office and the Ethiopian Trade Mission in Hargeisa. Including the suicide bombers, approximately twenty people were killed in the attacks.
Today in Minnesota, U.S. Attorney B. Todd Jones said of these cases, "The sad reality is that the vibrant Somali community here in Minneapolis has lost many of its sons to fighting in Somalia. These young men have been recruited to fight in a foreign war by individuals and groups using violence against government troops and civilians. Those tempted to fight on behalf of or provide support to any designated terrorist group should know they will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law."
Joining U.S. Attorney B. Todd Jones was Ralph S. Boelter, Special Agent in Charge of the Minneapolis field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who added, "It is through the sustained and dedicated efforts of the Minneapolis Joint Terrorism Task Force and the support of the Somali-American community that today we are able to disclose some of the significant progress we have achieved in this critical investigation. At the same time, I emphasize the sole focus of our efforts in this matter has been the criminal conduct of a small number of mainly Somali-American individuals and not the broader Somali-American community itself, which has consistently expressed deep concern about this pattern of recruitment activity in support of al-Shabaab."
Charging Documents Unsealed
The Justice Department announced that three charging documents were unsealed this morning in the District of Minnesota:
United States v. Mahamud Said Omar, 09-CR-242
On Aug. 20, 2009, a federal grand jury returned a five-count indictment charging Mahamud Said Omar with terrorism offenses. According to the indictment, from September 2007 through the present, Omar, who is a Somali citizen but was granted permanent U.S. resident status in 1994, conspired with others to provide financial assistance as well as personnel to terrorists and foreign terrorist organizations.
On Nov. 8, 2009, law enforcement authorities in the Netherlands arrested Omar according to a provisional arrest warrant. The United States has filed its request for extradition. According to documents unsealed this morning, including affidavits in support of the United States’ request for extradition of Omar from the Netherlands, Omar provided money to young men to travel from Minneapolis to Somalia to train with and fight for al-Shabaab.
Omar also allegedly visited an al-Shabaab safe-house and provided hundreds of dollars to fund the purchase of AK-47 rifles for men from Minneapolis.
Omar is in custody in the Netherlands.
United States v. Ahmed Ali Omar, Khalid Mohamud Abshir, Zakaria Maruf, Mohamed Abdullahi Hassan and Mustafa Ali Salat, 09-CR-50
On Aug. 20, 2009, a federal grand jury returned a second superseding indictment charging Ahmed Ali Omar, Khalid Abshir, Zakaria Maruf, Mohamed Hassan and Mustafa Salat with terrorism-related offenses.
These men were charged in the summer of 2009 with
- conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and foreign terrorist organizations;
- conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim and injure people outside the United States;
- possessing and discharging a firearm during a crime of violence;
- Solicitation to commit a crime of violence.
The indictments that detail the charges filed against these co-conspirators also were unsealed today.
None of the five defendants is in custody. All five are believed to be outside of the United States.
United States v. Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax
United States v. Abdiweli Yassin Isse
On Oct. 9, 2009, a criminal complaint was filed, charging Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax and Abdiweli Yassin Isse with conspiring to kill, kidnap, maim or injure persons outside the United States.
The affidavit filed in support of the complaint states that in the fall of 2007, Faarax and others met at a Minneapolis mosque to telephone co-conspirators in Somalia to discuss the need for Minnesota-based co-conspirators to go to Somalia to fight the Ethiopians.
The affidavit also alleges that later that fall, Faarax attended a meeting with co-conspirators at a Minneapolis residence, where he encouraged others to travel to Somalia to fight and told them how he had experienced true brotherhood while fighting a "jihad" in Somalia. Subsequently, Faarax was interviewed three times by authorities and each time denied fighting or knowing anyone who had fought in Somalia.
The criminal complaint states that Abdiweli Yassin Isse also encouraged others to travel to Somalia to fight the Ethiopians. He purportedly described at a gathering of co-conspirators his own plans to fight "jihad" against Ethiopians, and he raised money to buy airplane tickets for others to make the trip to Somalia for the same purpose.
In raising that money, he allegedly misled community members into thinking they were contributing money to send young men to Saudi Arabia to study the Koran. The complaint that details the charges filed against these co-conspirators also was unsealed today.
Faarax and Isse are not in custody. Both men are believed to be outside of the United States.
Guilty Pleas
The Justice Department also announced that four residents of Minneapolis have entered guilty pleas in connection with this investigation; one resident of Minneapolis awaits trial on charges that he made false statements to the FBI, and one resident of Minneapolis was recently indicted on related charges.
United States v. Kamal Hassan, 09-CR-38
On Feb. 18, 2009, Kamal Said Hassan pleaded guilty to one count of providing material support to terrorists and one count of providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, respectively. On Aug. 12, 2009, Hassan pleaded guilty to one count of making false statements to the FBI.
Hassan is in custody awaiting sentencing.
United States v. Abdifatah Yusuf Isse, 09-CR-50
United States v. Salah Osman Ahmed, 09-CR-50
On April 24, 2009, Abdifatah Yusuf Isse entered a guilty plea to one count of providing material support to terrorists. On July 28, 2009, Salah Osman Ahmed entered a guilty plea to one count of providing material support to terrorists.
Isse and Ahmed are in custody awaiting sentencing.
United States v. Adarus Abdulle Ali
On Nov. 2, 2009, Adarus Abdulle Ali pleaded guilty to an information charging him with one count of perjury for making false statements to a federal grand jury in December of 2008.
Ali has been released pending a sentencing hearing.
Additional Pending Cases
United States v. Abdow Munye Abdow
On Oct. 13, 2009, a federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment charging Abdow Munye Abdow with making false statements to the FBI. The indictment alleges that on Oct. 8, 2009, Abdow lied to FBI agents when he was questioned after returning to Minnesota from a road trip to southern California. Abdow purportedly told the agents only one other person traveled with him when, according to officials, four people accompanied him. In addition, Adbow allegedly told the agents he did not know how the rental car in which he rode had been financed when, according to officials, he had used his own debit card to pay for the car.
Abdow has been released pending trial.
United States v. Omer Abdi Mohamed
Mohamed has been released pending trial.
To date, the investigation into the recruitment of young men to join al-Shabaab and those supporting that recruiting effort has been conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Force with the assistance and cooperation of the Dutch KLPD; the Dutch Ministry of Justice; Judith Friedman at the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs; the U.S. Department of State; the embassies at Abu Dhabi, UAE; Sanaa, Yemen; and The Hague in the Netherlands; and the Department of Defense. The case is being prosecuted by W. Anders Folk, Assistant U.S. Attorney and William M. Narus, from the Justice Department’s Counterterrorism Section, with assistance having been provided by David Bitkower, formerly of the Counterterrorism Section and currently an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of New York.
An indictment is a determination by a grand jury that there is probable cause to believe that offenses have been committed by a defendant. A defendant, of course, is presumed innocent until he or she pleads guilty or is proven guilty at trial.
On Nov. 19, 2009, Omer Abdi Mohamed was arrested on charges that he conspired to provide material support to terrorists; that he provided material support to terrorists; and that he conspired to kill, kidnap, maim and injure persons outside the United States.
09-1267National Security Division
The Rest @ The Department of Justice
Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a Holds a War Council
Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Muhieddin, chairman of Somalia's main Sufi movement, Ahlu Sunna wal JamaaNAIROBI (AFP)
Somalia's main Sufi movement, Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa, on Thursday wrapped up an unprecedented conference in Nairobi to strategize its response to the rise and radicalization of the Shabaab group.
Dozens of the usually quiet religious movement's leaders have in recent days converged on Nairobi from Somalia and from Western exile to close ranks against what they see as an existential threat.
" The Shabaab are misguided people who have misunderstood the true values of Islam "
Overall chairman Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Muhieddin "The Shabaab are misguided people who have misunderstood the true values of Islam," overall chairman Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Muhieddin told AFP before leaving Kenya Thursday.
Sufism is dominant in clannish Somalia, where Muslim saints are often also clan founders, but its leading clerics have voiced concern that hardline Islamist groups such as the Al Qaeda-inspired Shabaab were slowly eradicating it.
It emphasizes the mystical dimension of Islam and includes practices considered as idolatry by the followers of the Wahhabi sect adopted by the Shabaab.
A year ago, Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa ('The Companions of the Prophet') took up arms after the Shabaab started hunting down Sufi faithful and desecrating their holy sites, notably in and around the southern Somali city of Kismayo.
"The Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa fighters are not a regular army who long for power, they are defending themselves and the lives of other Somalis whose way of life is threatened by the Shabaab's madness," Sheikh Sharif said.
Old religious feuds
" A group of people who were known as the Khawarij (or Kharijite) came to kill other Muslims who did not share their views. Now the Shabaab are killing Somalis because they are not with them "
Sheikh Sharif The Ahlu Sunna leader, the son of respected Somali cleric Sheikh Muhieddin Eli, explained the current conflict as a continuation of old religious feuds between Muslims touched off by the death of Prophet Mohamed.
"A group of people who were known as the Khawarij (or Kharijite) came to kill other Muslims who did not share their views. Now the Shabaab are killing Somalis because they are not with them," he said.
As Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa gathered in Nairobi for its inaugural "war council", a man sometimes described as the movement's political face was also in the Kenyan capital to seek support.
Recently appointed president of the semi-autonomous central state of Galmudug with Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa's blessing, Mohamed Ahmed Alin argued that his administration can help achieve what the central government in Mogadishu and its Western backers have failed to do.
"With some cooperation, I believe the Shebab could be eliminated from most of the country," he told AFP. "We need infrastructure support, military support, training of our troops but so far, just words and no action."
While the organization's military strength remains unclear, its grassroots nature gives it a popular legitimacy and territorial reach that no other movement can boast in fractious Somalia.
"In my region for example, Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa never used to be a political affiliation. Everybody is Ahlu Sunna, that's all," said Alin.
And despite the religious movement taking on a new and more political dimension as it seeks to beef up against the Islamist threat, its top leaders are quick to emphasize they have no further ambitions.
"We are not after power, what we are fighting for is a peaceful Somalia governed by its elected leaders," said Abdulkadir Mohamed Somow, a senior Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa leader from Mogadishu.
"Our movement is fighting the Shabaab forces of anarchy but we will lay down our weapons as soon as they have been eliminated," he said.
Another senior Ahlu Sunna figure based in Garowe, the administrative capital of the northern semi-autonomous state of Puntland, was more circumspect.
"If it is God's will we may one day have a role to play in running the country, but it is too early to say more, there are consultations going on in Nairobi and elsewhere," Abdullahi Mohamoud Hassan said.
The Rest @ Middle East News
Thursday, November 19, 2009
Al-Kassar Arms Trafficking Operation Exposed by Mediafax
This is a very rough translation of an article that appeared on the Romanina media network Mediafax on October 27, 2009. TBDA shows that they have been conducting an investigation for some time.
-Shimron Issachar
The contract between the company Romarm and used, according to UN publications, the arms trafficker Monzer Al-Kassar as a front for arms exports for brigades FARC has not been finalized, said Tuesday evening, the AFP, general manager of Romarm John whip.
Contract for supply of weapons to FARC alleged destination was not executed (Image: Archive Mediafax Foto)
"I can tell that Romarm a contract with the company Trowl Services Limited, which aim to contract the supply of products for police in Nicaragua. This contract, like all contracts that we conclude, it enters into force, according to a clear terms, I would say the primary, only after it received an export license to the National Authority for Control of Exports (ANCEX).
Although this agreement was an export license issued by ANCEX, it was immediately withdrawn and while it was valid was not made any delivery and has not received any money under this contract ", they said by phone, whip, agency AFP.
Director Romarm could not specify what were the reasons for which the license ANCEX was "immediately" withdrawn, adding that institutional relations between the institution endorses Romarm and exports "not involve the provision of explanations or additional information.
Whip's statements come in the context of the emergence of a magazine article published in the UN Institute for Disarmament, which shows that Monzer al-Kassar, a leading international arms trafficking network condemned by the U.S., has negotiated with Romarm Romanian company in 2007, buying arms which was to reach the Colombian group FARC.
In February, Monzer al-Kassar has been condemned by the District Court in New York to 30 years in prison for having agreed to provide arms Colombian terrorist group FARC.
"Monzer al-Kassar was convicted following a "sting?"organized by the U.S. Anti-Drug Agency (DEA), which had received large sums for the purchase of weapons, including sophisticated surface-to-air missiles.
The weapons were to be purchased from the Romanian company Romarm , which, as the evidence on record, did not oppose the sale, showed the article published in the magazine UN Institute for Disarmament Research in the field (UNIDIR), available on the website www.unidir.ch.
In response to those related by UNIDIR, whip said that no representative Romarm concluded any agreement with Monzer al-Kassar and it never provided any price list.
Also Tuesday, the Director of National Agency for Conventional Arms Exports Control said by telephone to the agency AFP, that the transaction which reported UNIDIR was never completed, leaving to understand that an institution that has not ever endorsed such export.
"Anyone can enter any contract, but this kind of business document contains a clause on consent from us, from ANCEX. Ask those from Romarm if they received any notice for that transaction," said ANCEX official, refusing any further comment.
"Probably to mislead the authorities in Romania", al-Kassar has used an intermediary to purchase arms and ammunition from Romarm. The intermediary was Milan Djurovic, the company Trawl Services Limited, registered in Britain but which is based in Belgrade, write the authors document UNIDIR.
Several instruments found in possession of al-Kassar shows that Milan Djurovic was used in business transactions (with) Transtrade GmbH. The UNIDIR report (said ) and export license C32.7515 was issued (May 16, 2007) between Romarm and Trawl Services Ltd, a copy (of)the contract between the two companies were found on Al-Kassar.
Previously, Nicolae Iancu, marketing director of Romarm, said to AFP that the number cited by UNIDIR is a contract, not a license to export the ANCEX.
It can be a very legally binding contract with a firm, but that has not received notice ANCEX. Maybe just as well be talking about a fake contract, and such cases we have seen in almost 30 activities to Romarm" Janco said.
Iancu, who was director of Romarm and 2007, when Kassar, under UNIDIR publication should be negotiated with the institution, argued that evidence from the authors expected the UN publication and, referring to the fact that the publication maintains that information is contained in testimony of one of U.S. agencies involved in its monitoring of Kassar said that testimony in the courts "may be false.
"The fact that the transaction was never made means that it is not approved by ANCEX without notice any weapon can be delivered across borders or understanding between Romarm and British company has not reached the stage of obtaining export license, "concluded Iancu, adding that the program is not allowed to study the document UNIDIR and does not remember the names of firms or persons involved in the alleged contract.
According to Iancu, the information presented in the publication UNIDIR are "speculation" and are part of a series of attacks aimed at destabilizing trade Romanian defense industry.
"In recent years (reports occured) in the international press (that there were) items with the wrong destination, real attacks aimed at destabilizing the Romanian defense industry," said Janco, Tuesday evening, (to the) agency AFP, stressing that in his opinion, and information about (the) contract that involved Monzer al-Kassar, a leading international arms trafficking network in the U.S. convicted, would enter into the same category.
Asked how it was possible to conclude such a contract by Romarm, Janco said that an opinion is a pre-export phase and that, in principle, may be concluded "many ways" of contracts, but (th coontracts) do not run until after supplies are approved by ANCEX.
"We are a state company, everything is checked. Work legally, so it hurts me when I see all these defamations" he concluded, adding that Romarm could take an official position "if you consider (it)appropriate".
Al-Kassar had received over $ 400,000 to purchase weapons, funds that would provide money (for use?) by the FARC in drug trafficking but were actually funds the U.S. Anti-Drug Agency (DEA) to organize flagrantului.
Al-Kassar had repeatedly link edarms with companies from Bulgaria and Romania and traveled to both countries to complete arrangements to purchase weapons, "explained DEA agent William Brown in U.S. court which tried the al-Kassar, his testimony was the main source UNIDIR document.
The American agent quoted by UNIDIR, the operation provided by the FARC (to)purchase the following weapons to al-Kassar:
Al-Kassar told us that he was in Bulgaria and would arrive the next day in Romania, of the arms contract. He was to meet on May 11, 2007 with representatives of the arms industry in Romania. We useed airline data to confirm that al-Kassar went to Romania on May 10, 2007, 'says DEA agent William Brown, quoted by the authors UNIDIR publication.
During the visit to Romania and Bulgaria, al-Kassar (brought)a table of prices of the companies Romarm (Romania) and Armitrans (Bulgaria), stresses the document, which he cites DEA agent William Brown said that "some of the weapons had been purchased Al-Kassar from Romarm.
Milan Djurovic intend to buy from Romarm
The weapons were to be bought by al-Kassar with 920,000 dollars and the price demanded (of) the FARC would be 2,005,000 dollars, according to the report UNIDIR.
Trawl Services Company, cited in Article UNIDIR, (was to) provide safety equipment and police protection and commercial organizations (suuport) worldwide. The company's website (says it) provides armored cars, gas masks, metal detectors and other products.
The contact is a mailbox in Salisbury, Wiltshire.
UN Institute for Disarmament Research in the field (UNIDIR) was established in 1980 by the UN General Assembly and operates as an autonomous entity within the UN structures
The Rest @ Mediafax
-Shimron Issachar
The contract between the company Romarm and used, according to UN publications, the arms trafficker Monzer Al-Kassar as a front for arms exports for brigades FARC has not been finalized, said Tuesday evening, the AFP, general manager of Romarm John whip.
Contract for supply of weapons to FARC alleged destination was not executed (Image: Archive Mediafax Foto)
"I can tell that Romarm a contract with the company Trowl Services Limited, which aim to contract the supply of products for police in Nicaragua. This contract, like all contracts that we conclude, it enters into force, according to a clear terms, I would say the primary, only after it received an export license to the National Authority for Control of Exports (ANCEX).
Although this agreement was an export license issued by ANCEX, it was immediately withdrawn and while it was valid was not made any delivery and has not received any money under this contract ", they said by phone, whip, agency AFP.
Director Romarm could not specify what were the reasons for which the license ANCEX was "immediately" withdrawn, adding that institutional relations between the institution endorses Romarm and exports "not involve the provision of explanations or additional information.
Whip's statements come in the context of the emergence of a magazine article published in the UN Institute for Disarmament, which shows that Monzer al-Kassar, a leading international arms trafficking network condemned by the U.S., has negotiated with Romarm Romanian company in 2007, buying arms which was to reach the Colombian group FARC.
In February, Monzer al-Kassar has been condemned by the District Court in New York to 30 years in prison for having agreed to provide arms Colombian terrorist group FARC.
"Monzer al-Kassar was convicted following a "sting?"organized by the U.S. Anti-Drug Agency (DEA), which had received large sums for the purchase of weapons, including sophisticated surface-to-air missiles.
The weapons were to be purchased from the Romanian company Romarm , which, as the evidence on record, did not oppose the sale, showed the article published in the magazine UN Institute for Disarmament Research in the field (UNIDIR), available on the website www.unidir.ch.
In response to those related by UNIDIR, whip said that no representative Romarm concluded any agreement with Monzer al-Kassar and it never provided any price list.
Also Tuesday, the Director of National Agency for Conventional Arms Exports Control said by telephone to the agency AFP, that the transaction which reported UNIDIR was never completed, leaving to understand that an institution that has not ever endorsed such export.
"Anyone can enter any contract, but this kind of business document contains a clause on consent from us, from ANCEX. Ask those from Romarm if they received any notice for that transaction," said ANCEX official, refusing any further comment.
"Probably to mislead the authorities in Romania", al-Kassar has used an intermediary to purchase arms and ammunition from Romarm. The intermediary was Milan Djurovic, the company Trawl Services Limited, registered in Britain but which is based in Belgrade, write the authors document UNIDIR.
Several instruments found in possession of al-Kassar shows that Milan Djurovic was used in business transactions (with) Transtrade GmbH. The UNIDIR report (said ) and export license C32.7515 was issued (May 16, 2007) between Romarm and Trawl Services Ltd, a copy (of)the contract between the two companies were found on Al-Kassar.
Previously, Nicolae Iancu, marketing director of Romarm, said to AFP that the number cited by UNIDIR is a contract, not a license to export the ANCEX.
It can be a very legally binding contract with a firm, but that has not received notice ANCEX. Maybe just as well be talking about a fake contract, and such cases we have seen in almost 30 activities to Romarm" Janco said.
Iancu, who was director of Romarm and 2007, when Kassar, under UNIDIR publication should be negotiated with the institution, argued that evidence from the authors expected the UN publication and, referring to the fact that the publication maintains that information is contained in testimony of one of U.S. agencies involved in its monitoring of Kassar said that testimony in the courts "may be false.
"The fact that the transaction was never made means that it is not approved by ANCEX without notice any weapon can be delivered across borders or understanding between Romarm and British company has not reached the stage of obtaining export license, "concluded Iancu, adding that the program is not allowed to study the document UNIDIR and does not remember the names of firms or persons involved in the alleged contract.
According to Iancu, the information presented in the publication UNIDIR are "speculation" and are part of a series of attacks aimed at destabilizing trade Romanian defense industry.
"In recent years (reports occured) in the international press (that there were) items with the wrong destination, real attacks aimed at destabilizing the Romanian defense industry," said Janco, Tuesday evening, (to the) agency AFP, stressing that in his opinion, and information about (the) contract that involved Monzer al-Kassar, a leading international arms trafficking network in the U.S. convicted, would enter into the same category.
Asked how it was possible to conclude such a contract by Romarm, Janco said that an opinion is a pre-export phase and that, in principle, may be concluded "many ways" of contracts, but (th coontracts) do not run until after supplies are approved by ANCEX.
"We are a state company, everything is checked. Work legally, so it hurts me when I see all these defamations" he concluded, adding that Romarm could take an official position "if you consider (it)appropriate".
Al-Kassar had received over $ 400,000 to purchase weapons, funds that would provide money (for use?) by the FARC in drug trafficking but were actually funds the U.S. Anti-Drug Agency (DEA) to organize flagrantului.
Al-Kassar had repeatedly link edarms with companies from Bulgaria and Romania and traveled to both countries to complete arrangements to purchase weapons, "explained DEA agent William Brown in U.S. court which tried the al-Kassar, his testimony was the main source UNIDIR document.
The American agent quoted by UNIDIR, the operation provided by the FARC (to)purchase the following weapons to al-Kassar:
- 4350 AKM assault rifles,
- 3350 by AKMS assault rifles,
- RPK 200 assault rifles,
- 50 rifle with telescope Dragunov,
- 500 Makarov pistols,
- 2,000,000 7.62 mm caliber bullets
- 120 grenade launchers RPG,
- 1650 PG-7V grenade and
- 2,400 hand grenades RGO-78.
Al-Kassar told us that he was in Bulgaria and would arrive the next day in Romania, of the arms contract. He was to meet on May 11, 2007 with representatives of the arms industry in Romania. We useed airline data to confirm that al-Kassar went to Romania on May 10, 2007, 'says DEA agent William Brown, quoted by the authors UNIDIR publication.
During the visit to Romania and Bulgaria, al-Kassar (brought)a table of prices of the companies Romarm (Romania) and Armitrans (Bulgaria), stresses the document, which he cites DEA agent William Brown said that "some of the weapons had been purchased Al-Kassar from Romarm.
Milan Djurovic intend to buy from Romarm
- 2,000 AKM assault rifles
- 2250 AKMS assault rifles,
- 200 RPK rifles,
- 50 rifles with Dragunov telescope
The weapons were to be bought by al-Kassar with 920,000 dollars and the price demanded (of) the FARC would be 2,005,000 dollars, according to the report UNIDIR.
Trawl Services Company, cited in Article UNIDIR, (was to) provide safety equipment and police protection and commercial organizations (suuport) worldwide. The company's website (says it) provides armored cars, gas masks, metal detectors and other products.
The contact is a mailbox in Salisbury, Wiltshire.
UN Institute for Disarmament Research in the field (UNIDIR) was established in 1980 by the UN General Assembly and operates as an autonomous entity within the UN structures
The Rest @ Mediafax
The Role of The Mosque in Europe A Swedish Case
Artikeln från is talking about the possibility of building a new Islamic center in a Swedish city "Helsingborg".
Of course the Swedish government believes that this Center will help to integrate muslims into Swedish society, they will become loyal to Sweden and they will maintain the national security! They may also think that their good treatment and support to muslims, despite the strong and growing opposition, would protect Sweden from the muslims Jihad! Such wrong beliefs, prove what we have always affirmed, that no one can understand the danger of the mosques ideology, if he was not born an Arab Muslim, received education at the hands of imams, had a daily contacts with them, and was active in the mosques. However, let us provide you with some of the evidence, which confirm that these beliefs wrong and dangerous.
Ahlalhdeeth or ‘Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama`aAl-Shabab ”Youth” and the Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a sect … Members of the Al-Sunna wal Jamma ‘Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama`a is the most dangerous official sect in all over the world because of their dangerous strategy based on brain-wash people especially children, girls and young Muslims in Europe through Islamic organizations , mosques and young associations and through the exploitation of both the European governments and politicians and they who want a new mosque in that city.
- They emphasizing:
- ( The Sunna of the Prophet, salallahu alaihi wa sallam, and the people who follow it.
- Praise belongs to God Who in every century inspires a group of scholarly people to defend the Way of the Prophet, salallahu alaihi wa sallam.
- Islam in the understanding of Muslims from every generations from the prophet on down is that the only Islam is the Islam of ahlu-sunnah wal jama’ah, the jam’ah being the jama’ah of the salafu-saalih.
- Their Islam was Islam and other than their Islam is not the correct Islam and Islam is only looked at from the route of how they viewed the Islamic etiquettes from manners all the way to fiqh and aqeedah to be )
- ”That his’ Ummah will split into seventy-three factions, all of them in Hell except one: The Jama’ah (the Community).” (Reported by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal)And (the Prophet) (peace be upon him) said in another hadith: ”They are those who will follow what I am and what my companions are today.” (at-Tirmidhi)
- Those referred to in this saying, those who hold firmly to pure, unadulterated Islam, became the people of the Sunnah and the Jama’ah. Amongst them are the Siddiqs, The martyrs, the righteous, included in them are the cairns of guidance, the lamps for darkness, the masters of memorable merits, the ever-remembered virtues;
- Among them are the Abdal 1 the Imams about whose judgment and understanding all Muslims agree. These are the victorious ones about whom the Prophet (peace be upon him) said:
A group of my ‘Ummah will continue to follow the truth prominently. Whoever betrays them or opposes them can never harm them to the Day of Judgment.” (al-Bukhari and Muslim)The creed and the aims of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’a
This is the difference between them and terrorists muslims. Therefore,
- the most important of their current employment in Europe is to present the mosques ideology peacefully and to fight the integration through the islamic centers , mosques and schools and working to raise generations of Muslim on the doctrine of the mosques.
- And then, those of the generations will be a strong base, can be moved and used for the implementation of the mosques strategic plan. However, the points below show a part of their ideolgy and policy:
- As you know they believe in the imams sunna – the Saudis Mohamad teaching – which asserts beating women, amputation of hands, cursed the Christians and Jews, to prevent alcohol, stoning of women, forcing women to veil, killing mockers, fighting secularism, prevent Muslims from paying taxes, prevent Muslims from converting to another religion…..
- Anti-Christian missionaries, churches and Jewish centers and secular parties. They asserted : ( The duty of the Muslim community — in order to preserve its identity — is to combat apostasy in all its forms and wherefrom it comes, giving it no chance to pervade in the Muslim world.)
- ( The four main schools of jurisprudence (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi`i, and Hanbali) as well as the other four schools of jurisprudence (the four Shiite schools of Az-Zaidiyyah, Al-Ithna-`ashriyyah, Al-Ja`fariyyah, and Az-Zaheriyyah) agree that apostates must be executed.)
- ( ”The blood of a Muslim who testifies that there is no god but Allah and that I am the Messenger of Allah is not lawful to shed unless he be one of three: a married adulterer, someone killed in retaliation for killing another, or someone who abandons his religion and the Muslim community.)
( such is me. I deny the doctrine of mosques, and I believe in secular countries and the ethics and the law of Europe )
- ( Religion occupies the very first place here as believers may sacrifice themselves, their country, and their wealth for the sake of their religion.)
- ( Refrain from fighting anyone whose death will cause more harm to the muslims )
( This also one of the reasons whay they deny and refuse to use the mosques official violence because it would harm musims such as expel them from Europe and the closure of mosques
They asserted :
- ( The principle aim of a mosque is to save the Muslims from melting in the Swedish society )
They asserted : ( One of the most important basic principles of our religion is that of al-walaa’ wa’l-baraa’, loyalty (walaa’) to Islam and its people, and diavowal (baraa’) of kufr and its people ( Christians, Jews and all non muslims ) )
What will be their work ?
The mosque would be aimed at matching other mosques aims because it same ideology , such as the:
- Cursing the Swedish people dozens of times each day
- To remind Muslims, especially young people, children and women that to love and follow the non-Muslims is forbidden .
- All mosques and imams agreed that a true believer does not love non muslims ,for whoever loves a kaafir is not a believer
- To prevent Muslims from integrating
- To convince Swedish people to turn to the imams ideology
- To prevent Muslim women from emancipation
- To prevent any Muslim to cooperate or recognize Israel
- To organize demonstrations against any citizen to criticize Islam, mosques
- To Bring the Saudis and other imams to give lectures to young people to be trained in Sharia and anti integration
Organizing trips for youth Muslim to States full of terrorists such as Yemen, under the pretext of learning the Arabic language collecting children in mosques to teach them the doctrine of imams
The establishment of official relations with politicians, for reasons I will mention in another article
The most important goal is to open Europe through Sweden, as provided in the doctrine of mosques
Therefore, to allow them to establish this mosque means helping to destabilize the national security and prevent the integration of Muslims.
The Rest @ Motmittsverige
Brother Daniel
From Radio Free Somalia
October 29, 2009 Radiofreesomalia.com
Guddoomiyaha Beelweynta mudulood ee waqooyiga Amerika Md. C/LAAHI AHMED GABALLE, isaga oo ku hadlaaya Magaciisa, kan Xubnaha beesha Mudulood , waxa uu Tacsi u dirayaa guud ahaan shacbiga Soomaliyeed, gaar ahaan qoyskii iyo ehelladii uu ka baxay Marxuum Macalin Nuur Maxamed Siyaad oo ku geeriyooday dalka Kenya taariikhda Markay ahayd 28 October 2009 laguna aasayo Qabuuraha Macalin Nuur ee magaladda Muqdisho.
Guddoomiyuhu waxa uu ilaahay uga baryayaa, inuu jannadiisa Firdowsa marxuumka ka waraabiyo, Samir
iyo iimaana eheladiisa ka siiyo.
INAA LILAAHI WA INAA ILAYHI RAAJUCUUN
Waxaa Tacsiyaddda si wada jira ah u diraya:
1-Fadumo A.M.Cade - Qoorweyne
2-Dr. Nuurto xaaji xasan
3-Caaqil Caraale Carshaan
4-Suldaan Cabdullahi Maxamuud Afrax
5-Cadow Calasow Cisman
6-Qadra Sh A. Gabale
7-Cali Cabdi Daylaco - Muqdisho
8-Maxamed qashow
9-Naciimo cali Axmed
10-maxamed nuur cali
11-Axmed m.mahdi
12 Abuukar sh.Galti
13-Maxamed Subiye
14-Inj. Cabdirahman Islow Mahadale
15 -Xasan Maxaadey
16-Cabdicasiis Caseyr
17-Maxamed ibraahim culusow
18-Axmed maxaad mahdi
19-Shoombe cumar calasow
20-Enj. Abdullahi Calas
21-Prof.. Maxamed Cadawe
22-Dahir Carale
23-Shire cali jumcaale
24- Abukar Boocow
25- Muse Kuulow
26- Shiine Beele
27-Yuusuf shaqaaq
28- Maxamed Ahmed Hagaf
29- Batuulo sh.axmed
30- Maxamed Iiman
31- Maxamed Cali Maxamud (Black)
32-Abdulqadir Iiman ( Ubbo)
33- Maxamed cali falaax
34-Yasiin Axmed Raage
MAGAALADA OTTAWA
1-xaaji cabdi cade
2-DR.cali cabdulle
3-Awees xuseen biif
4-Awees maxamed WAXOOL
5-C/QAADIR MAXAMED jus
6- Prof. - Maxamud Macalin ( Eebow)
7- Aweis Macalin - Hamilton
8-Dr. Cali Nur Cabdi
MAGAALADA EDMONTON
Axmed A. Omar
Axmed Hiraabe - Tanzania
Abdi Farah
Cali Xasan
Cumar Cali
Saciid Jimcaale
Xuseen Maxamed
Cabdi Cali
Said Suudi
Yaasin Sheekh M. Wardheere
Abdulahi Hussen Sheekh
Maxamed Muqtar
Sheekh Cali Xaaji Dufle
Siidi Isaaq IIdow
Abukar Hirabe
Abdulqadir Hirabe
Muse Xasan
Abdiweli Xirsi
Cabdi Cali Dheeere
Cumar Xuseen
Cabdulahi Sheekh Axmed Gabale .
Cabdulaahi A. Maxamed
Cabdirizaaq Muudey
Xuseen Sheekh Cabdulaahi
Maxamed Gurey
Axmed Cabdiraxmaan Baadiyow
Xasan yare
Cabdirashiid Xuseen
Cabdulaahi Xaaji Cali
Maxamed Xasan Baraawi
Xasan Islaw
Cabdiraxmaan Sheekh Cali
Cabdicasiis Cabdule Nuur
Cabdirisaq Muuse
Xasan Maxamed (Dukade)
Dr. Axmed Calas
Cali Islaw
Cali Xuseen
Xasan Cumar Jimcaale
Maxamed Cabdiraxmaan (Ajow)
Bashiir Dheerre
Xasan Muudey
Cabdulahi Hilowle
Cabdiwahaab Sheekh Axmed
Yuusuf A. Gare
Qadar Wiliq Wiliq
Yuusuf dhegafiiq
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Xasan Raaage
Aways Xaraare
Maxamed Cali Mire
Xuseen Maxamed ( Joovane)
Xasan Cali (Xasan Taata)
Maryam Cali Falaax
Ifraax Cabdi Xaashi
Sucdi Basay
Maana Cali Odasuge
Sahra Cali Hagarey
Mahado Maxamed Yalaxow
Wiilo Shucayb Jimcaale
Fowsiya Cabdulahi Cali Shire
Mulki Baadiyow
Drs. Saciida Cali Axmed Xayle
Casey Cumar Faarax
Saynab Sheekh
Gobolka MN - USA.
1. M.Haji Abdullahi ( Shuluulux)
2. Mohamed Hussein Abdulle ( Sharre)
3. Khalif Ahmed Ali Ulusow ( Dhegadheere)
4. Daahir Siyaad M. Damey
5. Nabaddoon Haji Hussein Jimale
6. Moallim Ahmed Halane
7. Abuker Hirabe Adan
8. Ahmeddey Elmi Rubac
9. Bashir Haji Iiman
10. Salah Mohamed
12. Dayid Mohamoud Sheikh
13. Amino A. Gabeyre & Seydkeeda A/llahi H. Moh'ed
14. Hassan Omar
15. Halyey Abdinor Mohamed
16. Mas'ud Sheikh Amir
17. Sakariye Abdullahi Ga'al
18. Abdullahi Muhudin
19. Omar Sheikh Ali
20. Shamso Hussein Kulmie
21. Abdinastah Mohamoud Sheikh
22. Haji Abdullahi Elmi
23. Ahmeddey Askari
24. Osman Ossoble
25. Da'ud Hassan Ali ( Ceydid)
26. Abdi Ali
27. Masadaq Sheikh Saa'id
28. Abbas Malaq Maxaad
29. Sheikh Abdullahi M. Hassan
30. Sheikh Omar Naji
31. Mohamed Osman ( Suumaaye)
32. A/qadir Haji Yusuf
33. Hussein Barakow
34. Omar Yusuf ( Dahab-shiil)
35. Dr. Ali Hussein ( San-tuur)
36. Wariye Shiin-guwe
37. Ilmo Haji Koogaar
38. Dr. Mohamed Ali Noor
39. Dr. Mohamed M. Jimale
40. Mohamed Hassan Nurow ( Abdulle)
41. A/qadir Omar Ahmed ( Shig shigo)
42. Abdisalad Mohamed Afrah ( Appolo)
43. Mohamoud Mudey Hassan
44. Ali Isse Ahmed
45. Dahabo Hadaafow
46. Saynab Ugaas
47. Madina Haji Arey
48. Madina Jeyte
49. Nabaddoon Mohamed Hassan
50. Islaw Ahmed Islaw
51. Sheikh Ali Hussein ( Jaras)
52. Sheikh Hassan Ali Alasow
53. Sheikh Ali Hilowle
54. Sheikh Mohamed Sh. Abdi
55. Sheikh Muuse
56. Moallim Ahmed Buraale
57. Moallim Isse Ahmed
58. Moallim Abdirahman
59. Prof. Noor Ali Ga'al
60. Dr. Ibrahim Mao ( Ghandi)
61. Osman Mohamed Sheikh
62. Abdullahi Ali Alasow
63. Ahmed Mohamed Shutul
64. Islaw Asad
65. Eng. Abdirahim
66. Omar Aw Roble
67. Dr. Ahmed Alas Ali Gurre
68. Muuse Kulow ( RFS)
69. Shukri Tohow Mohamed
70. Haji Hussein Ahmed Adle
71. Fowsiya Ahmed M. Sheikh
72. Abdullahi Haji Omar
73. Mohamed Omar Karani
74. Sahra Moallim
75. A/llahi Sheikh Ahmed
76. Hussein Jamleyste
77. Said Mohamed Hassan
78. Noor Ali Hassan
79 Xey-nuuf
80. Deeqow
81. Haji Abdi Muuse Maaxaay
82. Hussein Goley
83. Abdirahman Sheikh Hassan
84. Haji Hassan Nurow
85. Khamarey Ali Haji Abdulle
86. Abdi Yusuf ( Cawo & Maalin Horseed)
87. Wariye Mukhtar Ahmed ( Katiitow)
Magaalada Birmgham
1- Dr Cali Maxamed Xussein ( cali atom)
2- C/raxmaan Sheekh Xasan (timos)
3- Inj Ciise Maxamed Samow
4-Prof C/qadir Ruumi
5-Prof Maxamuud Nuur
6- Inj Siyaad bare nuur
7-Cali Axmed Jabaye
8- Dr Cusmaan Xaaji Jumaale kulmiye
9-Xaaji macow
10- Inj Yusuf Clasow
11- Aweys Maxamed Hilowle
12-Cawil Xuseen
13- Abdullahi Omar Adow ( fooldheere)
14- Abshir Maxamuud Nuur
15- Ismaciil Maxamuud Nuur
16-Maxamed Cali Maxamed
17-Sheekh Cali Xasan
18- Nuur Maxamuud
19- Xuseen Geedow
20 Xasan Maxamed Cosoble
21. Mahad cabdullahi eybakar
Wabilahi Towfiif
Radiofreesomalia.com
Thanks/Mahadsanid
MD. C/LAAHI AXMED GABALE
Guddoomiyaha Beelweynta mudulood ee waqooyiga Amerika
The Rest @ Radio Free Somalia
Guddoomiyaha Beelweynta mudulood ee waqooyiga Amerika Md. C/LAAHI AHMED GABALLE, isaga oo ku hadlaaya Magaciisa, kan Xubnaha beesha Mudulood , waxa uu Tacsi u dirayaa guud ahaan shacbiga Soomaliyeed, gaar ahaan qoyskii iyo ehelladii uu ka baxay Marxuum Macalin Nuur Maxamed Siyaad oo ku geeriyooday dalka Kenya taariikhda Markay ahayd 28 October 2009 laguna aasayo Qabuuraha Macalin Nuur ee magaladda Muqdisho.
Guddoomiyuhu waxa uu ilaahay uga baryayaa, inuu jannadiisa Firdowsa marxuumka ka waraabiyo, Samir
iyo iimaana eheladiisa ka siiyo.
INAA LILAAHI WA INAA ILAYHI RAAJUCUUN
Waxaa Tacsiyaddda si wada jira ah u diraya:
1-Fadumo A.M.Cade - Qoorweyne
2-Dr. Nuurto xaaji xasan
3-Caaqil Caraale Carshaan
4-Suldaan Cabdullahi Maxamuud Afrax
5-Cadow Calasow Cisman
6-Qadra Sh A. Gabale
7-Cali Cabdi Daylaco - Muqdisho
8-Maxamed qashow
9-Naciimo cali Axmed
10-maxamed nuur cali
11-Axmed m.mahdi
12 Abuukar sh.Galti
13-Maxamed Subiye
14-Inj. Cabdirahman Islow Mahadale
15 -Xasan Maxaadey
16-Cabdicasiis Caseyr
17-Maxamed ibraahim culusow
18-Axmed maxaad mahdi
19-Shoombe cumar calasow
20-Enj. Abdullahi Calas
21-Prof.. Maxamed Cadawe
22-Dahir Carale
23-Shire cali jumcaale
24- Abukar Boocow
25- Muse Kuulow
26- Shiine Beele
27-Yuusuf shaqaaq
28- Maxamed Ahmed Hagaf
29- Batuulo sh.axmed
30- Maxamed Iiman
31- Maxamed Cali Maxamud (Black)
32-Abdulqadir Iiman ( Ubbo)
33- Maxamed cali falaax
34-Yasiin Axmed Raage
MAGAALADA OTTAWA
1-xaaji cabdi cade
2-DR.cali cabdulle
3-Awees xuseen biif
4-Awees maxamed WAXOOL
5-C/QAADIR MAXAMED jus
6- Prof. - Maxamud Macalin ( Eebow)
7- Aweis Macalin - Hamilton
8-Dr. Cali Nur Cabdi
MAGAALADA EDMONTON
Axmed A. Omar
Axmed Hiraabe - Tanzania
Abdi Farah
Cali Xasan
Cumar Cali
Saciid Jimcaale
Xuseen Maxamed
Cabdi Cali
Said Suudi
Yaasin Sheekh M. Wardheere
Abdulahi Hussen Sheekh
Maxamed Muqtar
Sheekh Cali Xaaji Dufle
Siidi Isaaq IIdow
Abukar Hirabe
Abdulqadir Hirabe
Muse Xasan
Abdiweli Xirsi
Cabdi Cali Dheeere
Cumar Xuseen
Cabdulahi Sheekh Axmed Gabale .
Cabdulaahi A. Maxamed
Cabdirizaaq Muudey
Xuseen Sheekh Cabdulaahi
Maxamed Gurey
Axmed Cabdiraxmaan Baadiyow
Xasan yare
Cabdirashiid Xuseen
Cabdulaahi Xaaji Cali
Maxamed Xasan Baraawi
Xasan Islaw
Cabdiraxmaan Sheekh Cali
Cabdicasiis Cabdule Nuur
Cabdirisaq Muuse
Xasan Maxamed (Dukade)
Dr. Axmed Calas
Cali Islaw
Cali Xuseen
Xasan Cumar Jimcaale
Maxamed Cabdiraxmaan (Ajow)
Bashiir Dheerre
Xasan Muudey
Cabdulahi Hilowle
Cabdiwahaab Sheekh Axmed
Yuusuf A. Gare
Qadar Wiliq Wiliq
Yuusuf dhegafiiq
Cumar Jayte (Pilote)
Xasan Raaage
Aways Xaraare
Maxamed Cali Mire
Xuseen Maxamed ( Joovane)
Xasan Cali (Xasan Taata)
Maryam Cali Falaax
Ifraax Cabdi Xaashi
Sucdi Basay
Maana Cali Odasuge
Sahra Cali Hagarey
Mahado Maxamed Yalaxow
Wiilo Shucayb Jimcaale
Fowsiya Cabdulahi Cali Shire
Mulki Baadiyow
Drs. Saciida Cali Axmed Xayle
Casey Cumar Faarax
Saynab Sheekh
Gobolka MN - USA.
1. M.Haji Abdullahi ( Shuluulux)
2. Mohamed Hussein Abdulle ( Sharre)
3. Khalif Ahmed Ali Ulusow ( Dhegadheere)
4. Daahir Siyaad M. Damey
5. Nabaddoon Haji Hussein Jimale
6. Moallim Ahmed Halane
7. Abuker Hirabe Adan
8. Ahmeddey Elmi Rubac
9. Bashir Haji Iiman
10. Salah Mohamed
12. Dayid Mohamoud Sheikh
13. Amino A. Gabeyre & Seydkeeda A/llahi H. Moh'ed
14. Hassan Omar
15. Halyey Abdinor Mohamed
16. Mas'ud Sheikh Amir
17. Sakariye Abdullahi Ga'al
18. Abdullahi Muhudin
19. Omar Sheikh Ali
20. Shamso Hussein Kulmie
21. Abdinastah Mohamoud Sheikh
22. Haji Abdullahi Elmi
23. Ahmeddey Askari
24. Osman Ossoble
25. Da'ud Hassan Ali ( Ceydid)
26. Abdi Ali
27. Masadaq Sheikh Saa'id
28. Abbas Malaq Maxaad
29. Sheikh Abdullahi M. Hassan
30. Sheikh Omar Naji
31. Mohamed Osman ( Suumaaye)
32. A/qadir Haji Yusuf
33. Hussein Barakow
34. Omar Yusuf ( Dahab-shiil)
35. Dr. Ali Hussein ( San-tuur)
36. Wariye Shiin-guwe
37. Ilmo Haji Koogaar
38. Dr. Mohamed Ali Noor
39. Dr. Mohamed M. Jimale
40. Mohamed Hassan Nurow ( Abdulle)
41. A/qadir Omar Ahmed ( Shig shigo)
42. Abdisalad Mohamed Afrah ( Appolo)
43. Mohamoud Mudey Hassan
44. Ali Isse Ahmed
45. Dahabo Hadaafow
46. Saynab Ugaas
47. Madina Haji Arey
48. Madina Jeyte
49. Nabaddoon Mohamed Hassan
50. Islaw Ahmed Islaw
51. Sheikh Ali Hussein ( Jaras)
52. Sheikh Hassan Ali Alasow
53. Sheikh Ali Hilowle
54. Sheikh Mohamed Sh. Abdi
55. Sheikh Muuse
56. Moallim Ahmed Buraale
57. Moallim Isse Ahmed
58. Moallim Abdirahman
59. Prof. Noor Ali Ga'al
60. Dr. Ibrahim Mao ( Ghandi)
61. Osman Mohamed Sheikh
62. Abdullahi Ali Alasow
63. Ahmed Mohamed Shutul
64. Islaw Asad
65. Eng. Abdirahim
66. Omar Aw Roble
67. Dr. Ahmed Alas Ali Gurre
68. Muuse Kulow ( RFS)
69. Shukri Tohow Mohamed
70. Haji Hussein Ahmed Adle
71. Fowsiya Ahmed M. Sheikh
72. Abdullahi Haji Omar
73. Mohamed Omar Karani
74. Sahra Moallim
75. A/llahi Sheikh Ahmed
76. Hussein Jamleyste
77. Said Mohamed Hassan
78. Noor Ali Hassan
79 Xey-nuuf
80. Deeqow
81. Haji Abdi Muuse Maaxaay
82. Hussein Goley
83. Abdirahman Sheikh Hassan
84. Haji Hassan Nurow
85. Khamarey Ali Haji Abdulle
86. Abdi Yusuf ( Cawo & Maalin Horseed)
87. Wariye Mukhtar Ahmed ( Katiitow)
Magaalada Birmgham
1- Dr Cali Maxamed Xussein ( cali atom)
2- C/raxmaan Sheekh Xasan (timos)
3- Inj Ciise Maxamed Samow
4-Prof C/qadir Ruumi
5-Prof Maxamuud Nuur
6- Inj Siyaad bare nuur
7-Cali Axmed Jabaye
8- Dr Cusmaan Xaaji Jumaale kulmiye
9-Xaaji macow
10- Inj Yusuf Clasow
11- Aweys Maxamed Hilowle
12-Cawil Xuseen
13- Abdullahi Omar Adow ( fooldheere)
14- Abshir Maxamuud Nuur
15- Ismaciil Maxamuud Nuur
16-Maxamed Cali Maxamed
17-Sheekh Cali Xasan
18- Nuur Maxamuud
19- Xuseen Geedow
20 Xasan Maxamed Cosoble
21. Mahad cabdullahi eybakar
Wabilahi Towfiif
Radiofreesomalia.com
Thanks/Mahadsanid
MD. C/LAAHI AXMED GABALE
Guddoomiyaha Beelweynta mudulood ee waqooyiga Amerika
The Rest @ Radio Free Somalia
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